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[1257] 
Constitutional Constraints on Punitive 
Damages: Clarity, Consistency, and the Outlier 
Dilemma 
Laura J. Hines* and N. William Hines** 
Almost twenty years ago, the Supreme Court in BMW v. Gore invoked the Due Process 
Clause for the first time to invalidate a punitive damages award as excessive. Since then, 
the Court has issued a handful of decisions that further refine Gore’s tripartite guidepost 
framework. In this Article, we draw on a ten-year span of reported state and federal 
punitive damages decisions in an attempt to evaluate how lower courts have understood 
and implemented this constitutionalization of punitive damages law. Ours is not a 
normative analysis about whether the Court should or should not have federalized 
punitive damages. Rather, we examined a sample of cases to assess three of the Court’s 
punitive damages due process objectives.  
 
First, the guideposts were intended to provide clear and predictable ex ante standards 
regarding the potential monetary consequences of misconduct. Second, the uniform 
guidepost standards sought to prevent arbitrary or disparate treatment of punitive 
damages among the states. Third, the guideposts were designed to curb what the Court 
perceived as erratically high punitive damages awards. We evaluated and coded each 
punitive damages case in our collection to test the efficacy of the guidepost analysis in 
accomplishing each of these goals. Our 507 case sample suggests a high degree of 
uniformity nationwide in the process by which courts conduct the review of punitive 
damages awards. Less clear, however, is whether that heightened level of judicial review 
significantly reduced the inconsistency or unpredictability of punitive damages awards 
overall.  
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Introduction 
Since 1996, the Supreme Court has imposed a constitutionally 
mandated obligation upon state and federal courts to review each award 
of punitive damages for “excessiveness.”1 The due process standards for 
identifying excessive punitive damages require an examination of the 
 
 1. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
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reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the proportionality of the 
punitive damages awarded to the compensatory damages awarded, and a 
comparison of the punitive damages awarded to statutory or other 
applicable sanctions. These three “guideposts,” established in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore,2 and later refined in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell,3 have been subjected to a 
host of judicial and academic critiques.4 This Article eschews any such 
normative analysis of the Court’s constitutionalization of punitive damages. 
Rather, we set out to examine the extent and nature of lower court 
implementation of the Court’s guidepost framework. 
To that end, we have compiled a dataset of 507 state and federal 
opinions issued in the decade after Campbell, and applied various criteria 
in order to analyze how lower courts have utilized (or failed to utilize) the 
three guideposts in their review of punitive damages awards.5 Without 
engaging in the fraught exercise of judging what a “fair” amount of punitive 
damages might be in any particular case, we nonetheless designed our 
study to evaluate lower court implementation of the guideposts by the 
metric of the Court’s articulated goals: clear and predictable punitive 
damages limits; consistent standards of judicial review; and constraint of 
punitive damages awards deemed to be outliers, either due to sheer 
enormity or the disproportionality of the award to the harm caused. 
In Part I, this Article provides a brief account of the Court’s evolving 
punitive damages jurisprudence, including the three-guidepost framework. 
Part II describes our methodology for selecting opinions for our sample 
of cases. The data from our survey of punitive damages opinions is 
presented in Part III, which examines how lower courts implement each 
guidepost. While certain aspects of the guideposts appear to be operating 
smoothly, we observed a marked lack of clarity and consistency among 
lower courts in their application of other aspects of the Court’s guidepost 
recommendations. A surprisingly large number of lower courts failed to 
explicitly apply any of the Court’s reprehensibility criteria,6 and over half 
of the opinions in our study either omitted analysis of the comparability 
guidepost altogether or found no relevant sanction with which to compare 
the punitive damages award at issue.7 We also identify several guidepost 
 
 2. Id. at 574. 
 3. 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003). 
 4. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: 
“Morals Without Technique?”, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 349 (2008); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory 
of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 239 (2009); Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 
46 Willamette L. Rev. 449 (2010). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Table 2. 
 7. See infra Table 11. 
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criteria that reflect lower court variation or innovation, such as resistance 
to the Court’s preference for 1:1 ratios in cases involving substantial 
compensatory awards, consideration of defendant’s wealth, and widespread 
reliance on comparable punitive damages awards. Finally, we identify a 
number of guidepost criteria in need of reform or greater elucidation in 
light of our analysis of how lower courts understand and apply the 
guideposts. 
I.  The Consitutionalization of Punitive Damages 
A. Due Process Scrutiny of Punitive Damages Awards for 
“Excessiveness” 
The Court’s 1996 decision to recognize substantive due process 
limits on the amount of punitive damages was many years in the making 
and encountered fierce resistance within the Court.8 The need for reform 
was seen as addressing two somewhat distinct problems that combined to 
produce the impression of great unpredictability in the size of punitive 
damages awards: (1) the lack of consistency among courts with respect to 
the rigor of judicial review applied to punitive damages awards and 
(2) the absence or inadequacy of objective external standards to assess the 
reasonableness of a specific award.9 Another chief driver of the 
federalization of punitive damages law seems to have been the widely held 
perception that lower courts were failing to adequately police against 
spiraling punitive damages awards. The Court later acknowledged the 
significant body of empirical research largely debunking the notion that 
punitive damages were out of control.10 But enforcing due process 
safeguards against the imposition of unreasonably excessive or punitive 
damages remains a primary concern, especially with regard to what the 
 
 8. The Justices split five to four in Gore, six to three in Campbell, and five to three in Exxon 
Shipping. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 
471 (2008); Campbell, 538 U.S. 408. 
 9. At this time, state and federal lower courts generally reviewed the grounds for awarding punitive 
damages and the size of the awards utilizing very broad and open-ended tests, such as whether the award 
appeared fair and reasonable, taking all the facts of the case into account, or, to the contrary, whether 
the award reflected passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Another common test was whether the 
size of the award “shocked the conscience of the court.” See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts § 2, at 14–15 (5th ed. 1984); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 314–15 (2d ed. 1993). 
 10. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 494; see, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and 
Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 
2001 Data, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 263–95 (2006) (concluding that once the relevant punitive 
damages data was controlled for the occasional outlier case, and adjusting for inflation, the average size 
of punitive damages awards had actually remained fairly constant during the decade before Gore); 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623 (1997) 
(challenging claim that punitive damages were increasing dramatically in either frequency and size); Robert 
J. Rhee, A Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 33, 47–49 (2012). 
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Court has described as “outlier” awards.11 A brief history of the Court’s 
punitive damages jurisprudence reveals both the nature of that persistent 
interest and the intended goals of the Court’s due process standards. 
1. Evolution of the Supreme Court’s Punitive Damages 
Jurisprudence 
The view that punitive damages awards pose a serious constitutional 
threat can readily be found in judicial opinions and legal scholarship from 
the 1980s and early 1990s.12 Indeed, in her concurring and dissenting 
opinions in that era, Justice O’Connor launched a virtual one-Justice 
campaign to persuade the Court to develop some constitutional mechanism 
to rein in out-of-control punitive damages awards. Justice O’Connor’s 
opinions were peppered with alarmist descriptions of the punitive damages 
landscape such as “skyrocketing,”13 “run wild,” “inexplicable on any basis 
but caprice or passion,”14 and unpredictable windfalls.15 She also contended 
that the imposition of punitive damages required federal intervention 
because they permitted juries “to target unpopular defendants, penalize 
unorthodox or controversial views, and redistribute wealth.”16 
The first hint that arbitrary or extremely large punitive damages might 
raise constitutional concerns under the Due Process Clause17 arose in the 
 
 11. But see Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punitive 
Damages for Good, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 525, 585 (2011) (“[I]t seems fair to say that the Court, given its current 
makeup, will no longer take punitive damages cases even if they do not comply with the Gore guideposts.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 
56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1982). 
 13. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989). 
 14. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 476 (1993). 
 15. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (citing Elec. Workers v. Foust, 
442 U.S. 42, 50 (1979)). 
 16. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1991). Justice O’Connor also asserted that 
punitive damages were a “powerful weapon,” which if imposed indiscriminately could have a “devastating 
potential for harm.” Id. at 42. She also cited amicus briefs from manufacturing trade associations to 
suggest that the design and production of innovative products was stifled by manufacturers’ fear of possibly 
huge punitive damages awards. Id. at 46. But see Daniel W. Morton-Bentley, Law, Economics, and 
Politics: The Untold History of the Due Process Limitation on Punitive Damages, 17 Roger Williams 
U. L. Rev. 791 (2012) (asserting that the Court’s invocation of due process is just window dressing for an 
effort to prevent financial harm to large corporations and contrary to the historic function of punitive 
damages to hold society’s powerful accountable). 
 17. For the first 150 years in which the Court dealt with only the occasional punitive damages 
case, it showed little or no interest in claims that punitive damages awards could be unconstitutionally 
arbitrary or excessive. Beginning with Day v. Woodworth, the Court repeatedly approved as constitutional 
the common law practice of relying on jury determinations to award punitive damages. 54 U.S. 363 (1851). In 
the 1960s, two prominent U.S. Court of Appeals judges in different circuits expressed grave concerns about 
the exploding size and undisciplined nature of punitive damages awards. See, e.g., Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 
351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965) (Rives, J., dissenting); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (1967) 
(Friendly, J., concurring). As late as 1984, however, the Court still manifested a general disinterest in giving 
close scrutiny to the size of state punitive damages awards generally, saying in one high-profile case: 
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Court’s 1986 decision in Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Lavoie.18 Writing 
for the Court, Chief Justice Burger declined to address the defendant’s 
claim that awarding very large punitive damages violated either the Eighth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment, but noted that both claims 
raised “important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be 
resolved.”19 
Five years later, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. 
Haslip, a slim majority accepted in principle the contention that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment furnished a constitutional 
basis for overturning arbitrary or excessive punitive damages awards.20 
But the Court’s due process commitment remained theoretical because it 
found that the punitive damages award at issue satisfied both procedural 
and substantive constitutional requirements. Writing for the majority, 
however, Justice Blackmun noted that the 4:1 ratio of punitive damages 
to compensatory damages in the case was “close to the line” of 
unconstitutional excessiveness for an ordinary tort case.21 Justice Scalia’s 
lengthy concurring opinion argued that excessive punitive damages could 
not logically violate due process because the imposition of punitive damages 
by U.S. courts antedated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
many years.22 
In its next punitive damages case, the Court in TXO Production 
Corporation v. Alliance Resources Corporation similarly declined to find 
the punitive damages award at issue to be unconstitutionally excessive.23 
Interestingly, the Court reached this decision by converting the 526:1 
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages at issue into a 10:1 ratio by 
substituting an amount reflecting the “potential harm” that might have 
occurred if the defendant’s fraudulent scheme had succeeded instead of 
the actual harm represented by the compensatory damages award.24 
 
“Punitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law.” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 
464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984). 
 18. 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986). 
 19. Id. at 828–29. 
 20. 499 U.S. 1, 26 (1991). 
 21. Id. at 23. In her dissent in Haslip, Justice O’Connor continued to urge the Court to adopt some 
form of substantive constitutional constraint on the size of punitive damages awards, arguing that the 
tradition of complete deference to juries’ discretion to set such awards was so unprincipled as to raise 
constitutional “void for vagueness” concerns. Id. at 43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. at 28–32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (tracing the history of the concept of due process back to the 
phrase “law of the land” in the Magna Carta). 
 23. 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993). 
 24. Id. at 462. Writing separately, Justice Scalia again disputed the plurality’s assumption that 
substantive due process could be invoked as a constraint against unreasonably high punitive damages. Id. at 
472 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The plurality’s continued assertion that federal judges have some, almost-
never-usable, power to impose a standard of ‘reasonable punitive damages’ through the clumsy medium 
of the Due Process Clause serves only to spawn wasteful litigation, and to reduce the incentives for the 
proper institutions of our society to undertake that task.”). 
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Finally, in 1996, the Court struck down a punitive damages award as 
a violation of the defendant’s substantive due process rights for the first 
time in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.25 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Stevens reasoned that “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined 
in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice 
not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of 
the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”26 Justice Stevens then 
articulated a tripartite set of constitutional standards of the type Justice 
O’Connor had long championed, which he labeled “guideposts”: degree 
of reprehensibility, ratio, and sanctions for comparable misconduct.27 Justice 
Stevens briefly explained the reasoning behind each guidepost and then 
applied to the facts of the case in finding that the challenged punitive 
damages award fell short on each of the three indicia of excessiveness.28 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg cited federalism concerns for her 
opposition to the Court’s unwarranted intrusion into an area of law 
traditionally committed to state decisionmaking.29 Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, on the other hand, reiterated their deeply held view that the Due 
Process Clause could not form the basis of a substantive challenge to 
excessive punitive damages awards.30 Moreover, Justice Scalia offered a 
harsh critique of the guideposts themselves, memorably describing them 
as representing a “road to nowhere.”31 He predicted that the “crisscrossing 
platitudes” would prove incomprehensible and unworkable for lower court 
implementation: 
The Court has constructed a framework that does not genuinely constrain, 
that does  not inform state legislatures and lower courts—that does nothing 
at all except confer  an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially 
ad hoc determination that this particular award of punitive damages was 
not “fair.”32 
 
 25. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 26. See id. at 574; see also Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Blaine H. Evanson, Essay, The Enduring and 
Universal Principle of “Fair Notice”, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 193 (2013). But see Martha T. McCluskey, 
Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State Farm, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 1035, 1046–47 (2008) 
(critiquing this “fair notice” rationale as deeply flawed and stunting the development of neutral legal 
principles). 
 27. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–85. 
 28. Id. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., Justice Ginsburg’s dissent traced 
the origins of the three guideposts. She observed that the first and second guideposts codified deeply 
rooted state common law standards, but the Court created the comparability guidepost out of whole 
cloth. See 532 U.S. 424, 448–50 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 29. Gore, 517 U.S. at 610–14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 598–605 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 605. 
 32. Id. at 606. 
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The Court reaffirmed and further refined the Gore guideposts in 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell.33 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Kennedy embraced the Gore guideposts analysis 
with relish, proposing an even more detailed ratio framework. Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent took particular umbrage at this set of ratio instructions, 
which she described as resembling “marching orders” for lower courts.34 
The opinion in Campbell shed far less light on the first and third guideposts. 
With respect to the third guidepost, Justice Kennedy explained, “we 
need not dwell long on this guidepost” given the $10,000 applicable civil 
sanction.35 As in Gore, the punitive damages award so far exceeded the 
relevant statutory penalty the Court simply ticked off the guidepost as 
supporting a finding of excessiveness. Campbell’s reprehensibility analysis 
focused almost exclusively on the relevance of harm to others, cautioning 
that punitive awards could not actually punish a defendant for harm to 
others, but the Court did permit evidence of sufficiently “similar” 
misconduct to be factored into the reprehensibility assessment.36 In her 
dissenting opinion, however, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the majority 
had failed to adequately evaluate several important indicia of State Farm’s 
culpability: its repeated acts of intentional trickery and deceit,37 its profit 
motivation,38 and its targeting of plaintiffs who were financially, physically, 
and emotionally vulnerable.39  
In its two most recent punitive damages cases, Philip Morris USA, 
Inc. v. Williams40 and Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker,41 the Court 
declined opportunities to rule on the excessiveness of challenged punitive 
damages awards under the Gore/Campbell due process guideposts.42 In 
 
 33. 538 U.S. at 439. Five years after Gore, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the substantive 
due process analysis in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, but did not apply the guideposts 
to the 90:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages presented. 532 U.S. 424, 441–43 (2001). 
The Court instead remanded the case, holding that procedural due process required a de novo review of 
punitive damages awards to determine compliance with the emerging constitutional guidepost requirements. 
Id. at 443; see also Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and 
Criminal Punishment, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 880, 918 (2004) (suggesting that the Court in Cooper “clearly 
assumed that de novo review would provide two opportunities to bring excessive punitive damages awards 
into line”). 
 34. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Even if I were prepared to accept the 
flexible guideposts prescribed in Gore, I would not join the Court’s swift conversion of those guides into 
instructions that begin to resemble marching orders.”). 
 35. See id. at 428 (majority opinion). 
 36. See id. at 422–24. 
 37. See id. at 431–37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 38. See id. at 435 (referring to State Farm’s “wrongful profit” scheme). 
 39. See id. at 433–34 (characterizing the Campbells as “economically vulnerable and emotionally fragile”). 
 40. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 41. 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 42. The grant of certiorari in Philip Morris (involving a 97:1 punitive damages ratio) was limited to 
the constitutional correctness of a jury instruction regarding the relevance of possible injury to others 
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Williams, the Court based its decision on procedural due process, imposing 
on states the obligation to implement jury instructions that adequately 
safeguard against punitive damages based improperly on harm done to 
others.43 Williams involved a $79 million punitive damages award for the 
wrongful death of a smoker,44 a context far removed from the economic 
wrongdoing and injuries addressed in its previous punitive cases.  
In Exxon Shipping, the Court reversed a $2 billion punitive award 
under newly promulgated substantive maritime law limits on punitive 
damages, while deliberately sidestepping the question of whether the 
award might also have been constitutionally excessive.45 As in Campbell, 
the majority in Exxon wasted little time on either comparable sanctions 
or reprehensibility factors, although it identified for the first time that a 
defendant’s profit motive warranted a finding of aggravated culpability.46 
The Court instead emphasized the difference between the “reckless” 
conduct exhibited by Exxon and intentional or malicious conduct signifying 
a higher degree of culpability.47 
Notably, Justice Souter’s opinion acknowledged the lack of any 
empirical support for the perception of out-of-control punitive damages 
awards that led the Court to establish the Gore/Campbell constitutional 
analysis in the first place.48 Despite the overall modesty of punitive damage 
awards, Justice Souter opined, heightened scrutiny of punitive damages is 
warranted due to the “stark unpredictability” of punitive damages, coupled 
with the problem of “outlier cases [that] subject defendants to punitive 
damages that dwarf the corresponding compensatories.”49 After considering 
various state-tested approaches to excessiveness, the Court relied almost 
 
than the plaintiff. The case made it back to the Court in 2009 after the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed 
the award on remand, but was dismissed after oral arguments as an improvidently granted. See Philip 
Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 556 U.S. 178 (2009). The Williams saga inspired a good bit of law review 
commentary. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, 
Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 Yale L.J. 392 (2008); N. William Hines, Marching to a 
Different Drummer: Are Lower Courts Faithfully Implementing the Evolving Due Process Guideposts to 
Catch and Correct Excessive Punitive Damages Awards?, 62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 371 (2013); Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages in the Wake of Philip Morris v. 
Williams, 46 Willamette L. Rev. 449 (2010); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and 
Preemption, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1757, 1774 (2012) (describing the Oregon Supreme Court’s refusal to 
reduce the punitive award on remand as “a striking display of recalcitrance” to which the Supreme Court 
simply “threw up their hands in exasperation”). 
 43. Williams, 549 U.S. at 355. 
 44. Id. at 350. 
 45. Exxon, 554 U.S. 471. 
 46. Id. at 494. 
 47. Id. at 510–11. 
 48. Id. at 500. But see Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages by the Numbers: Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 18 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 259 (2010) (presenting a complex statistical analysis to dispute 
the Court’s rationale for a 1:1 ratio in Exxon). 
 49. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 500. 
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exclusively on the ratio test as the best mechanism to curb these “outlier 
cases.” It reached this conclusion due to its lack of confidence in the 
efficacy of state judicial review standards that closely resemble the Gore/ 
Campbell guideposts themselves: 
[We are] skeptical that verbal formulations, superimposed on general 
jury instructions, are the best insurance against unpredictable outliers. 
Instructions can go just so far in promoting systemic consistency when 
awards are not tied to specifically proven items of damage . . . and 
although judges in the States that take this approach may well produce 
just results by dint of valiant effort, our experience in the analogous 
business of criminal sentencing leaves us doubtful that anything but a 
quantified approach will work.50 
Absent the usual allowances for cases involving “modest economic harm or 
odds of detection,” Justice Souter adopted Campbell’s suggested 1:1 ratio 
as the proper benchmark in maritime cases for cases involving substantial 
compensatory damages and “without intentional or malicious conduct” 
or “behavior driven primarily by desire for gain.”51 He based that particular 
benchmark, in part, on several empirical studies that had found median 
punitive to compensatory ratios to hover somewhere below 1:1. Those 
findings suggested to Justice Souter that a ratio of 1:1 (or less) reflected 
broad consensus of what constitutes proportional punitive damages.52 
2. The Gore/Campbell Guideposts 
a. Degree of Reprehensibility 
The Court in Gore (and again in Campbell) proclaimed the degree of 
reprehensibility to be “the most important indicium of the reasonableness 
of a punitive damages award.”53 That assertion is not self-evident, given 
the outsized role played by the ratio analysis both in traditional punitive 
damages law and in the new constitutional jurisprudence. As we 
discovered while reviewing our collection of lower court cases, however, 
reprehensibility may be indeed the most important guidepost because the 
concept plays two pivotal roles in the Court’s due process jurisprudence. 
First, a punitive damages award may not be sustained at all unless some 
significant degree of reprehensibility is identified with regard to the 
 
 50. Id. at 504. 
 51. Id. at 513.  
 52. Id. at 512–13 (pointing to empirical studies “showing the median ratio of punitive to compensatory 
verdicts, reflecting what juries and judges have considered reasonable across many hundreds of cases”). 
The Court thought “it [was] fair to assume that the greater share of the verdicts studied in these 
comprehensive collections reflect reasonable judgments about the economic penalties appropriate in their 
particular cases.” Id. 
 53. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
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defendant’s misconduct.54 Second, assuming that some amount of punitive 
damages is justified, the degree of reprehensibility can play a key role in 
sustaining, lowering, or raising the constitutionally permissible ratio of 
punitive damages to compensatory damages. 
In adopting the somewhat unconventional term “degree of 
reprehensibility” for the first guidepost, the Court presumably sought to 
avoid the possible confusion created by the many grounds for imposing 
punitive damages prescribed in state statutes and endorsed in prior judicial 
decisions.55 Use of the term “degree of reprehensibility” was thus intended 
to capture the idea of egregiously bad or morally outrageous misbehavior 
by a defendant, without bringing along the baggage of all the synonyms 
used for this purpose across the legal landscape.56 
Perhaps realizing he was introducing a relatively unconventional term 
to the punitive damages review process, Justice Stevens briefly sketched out 
five factors in Gore to assist lower courts in identifying highly reprehensible 
conduct, and then applied them to Gore’s claim against BMW.57 The five 
reprehensibility factors are: (1) the imposition of physical harm versus 
purely economic harm; (2) indifference to or reckless disregard for the 
health or safety of others; (3) targeting a financially vulnerable plaintiff; 
(4) repeated instances of similar misconduct (as opposed to an isolated 
incident); and (5) harm resulting from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit 
rather than by carelessness.58 Neither Gore nor Campbell, however, 
 
 54. See Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why State Farm Won’t Be the Last 
Word, 37 Akron L. Rev. 779 (2004) (comparing Campbell’s ratio analysis to criminal sentencing guidelines, with 
aggravating and mitigating factors militating either increases or reductions in acceptable ratios). 
 55. Justice Stevens apparently borrowed the term “degree of reprehensibility” from Alabama’s so-
called “Green Oil” standard for reviewing punitive damages awards, applied in the lower court’s decision 
in Gore. See William E. Shreve, Jr., Exploring Wantonness, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 48 (2013) (discussing the 
meaning of “wantonness” in Alabama’s punitive damages jurisprudence). Reprehensibility may have 
been seen as a generic proxy for the multiple negative formulations courts have employed over the years 
to describe the type of grossly unacceptable or morally offensive misconduct the state may rightfully claim 
a legitimate interest in punishing and deterring: malicious, wanton, outrageous, egregious, morally offensive, 
wicked, despicable, detestable, deplorable, heinous, willful injury, deceitful, underhanded, done with an 
evil motive or mind, reckless indifference to other’s rights, aggravated injury, capricious harm, conscious 
disregard of property rights, coercive or oppressive misbehavior, trickery, intentional fraud, intentional 
breach of a fiduciary duty, and gross wrong characterized by its enormity. 
 56. Justice Stevens’ introduction of relatively novel terminology to implement a newly created 
constitutional requirement for the review of punitive damages awards is similar to what other Justices 
have done in modern times, presumably to stimulate a new analysis of a long-standing issue thought to 
be confusing to lower courts. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“essential 
nexus”); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (“rough proportionality”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Comm., 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (“total taking”). 
 57. Gore, 517 U.S. at 589–92. 
 58. Id. Justice Stevens did not manufacture these factors out of thin air; they were among the 
types of misconduct cited in earlier punitive damages cases like Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), and TXO, 
509 U.S. 443 (1993), and in Gore itself. 
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provided much insight into how courts should weigh each reprehensibility 
factor. 
As our dataset makes abundantly clear, the number of reprehensibility 
factors present in a particular case and their relative significance can vary 
greatly, depending on the nature of the claim made by the plaintiff and 
the egregiousness of the defendant’s misconduct.59 Assuming the presence 
of either physical harm or economic loss, the presence of one of the other 
four reprehensibility factors is likely sufficient to sustain a punitive damages 
award; on the other hand, the Court has intimated the absence of all five 
of the factors renders any punitive damages award “suspect,” if not 
unsustainable.60 The inherent vagueness of the five factors, however, 
arguably offers an inherent flexibility that allows lower courts to exercise 
judicial ingenuity to sort out the degree of reprehensibility in the stunning 
variety of punitive damages claims currently litigated in our nation’s 
courts.61 
b. Ratio of Punitive Damages to Plaintiff’s Harm (or 
Potential Harm)  
With respect to the ratio guidepost, the disparity or ratio between 
the punitive damages awarded and the actual (or potential harm) suffered 
by the plaintiff, the Court has noted that a reasonable relationship between 
punitive damages and compensatory damages has “a long pedigree” in 
U.S. law, and therefore represents perhaps the “most commonly cited 
indicium” of excessiveness.62 Despite the Court’s steadfast refusal to adopt 
anything approaching a rigid mathematical formula for ruling that any 
particular ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages is 
categorically excessive, its opinion in Campbell set out an escalating ratio 
framework that Justice Ginsburg scathingly characterized as “marching 
orders.”63 Campbell’s ratio guidance ranges from 1:1 (for cases involving 
“substantial” compensatory damages), to 2:1–4:1 (representing longstanding 
common law and statutory benchmarks of proportionality), to ratios in 
excess of double digits (justified by particularly egregious conduct coupled 
with either low economic damages, difficulty of detection, or difficulty of 
valuing harm).64 
In Exxon Shipping, Justice Souter echoed Campbell’s suggestion 
that a “substantial” compensatory award warranted a 1:1 punitive damages 
 
 59. See infra Table 4. 
 60. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
 61. See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 
957 (2007). 
 62. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580. 
 63. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 64. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. at 580; Hines, supra note 54.  
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ratio not only under maritime law, but also possibly under a due process 
analysis.65 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Exxon Shipping specifically 
protested this apparent adoption of Campbell’s dicta on 1:1 ratio limits, 
asking, “On next opportunity, will the Court rule, definitively, that 1:1 is 
the ceiling due process requires in all of the States, and for all federal 
claims?”66 
The Court has clearly expressed a strong preference for “single digit” 
ratios.67 As the Court mused in Haslip, 4:1 ratios may be close to the line, 
and certainly ratios larger than 4:1 raise a suspicion of excessiveness.68 
Low single-digit damage multipliers have long been a part of U.S. law to 
raise the stakes for certain types of civil violations,69 including the traditional 
double or treble damages for committing waste,70 and the treble damages 
available for certain federal antitrust violations.71 The Court’s explanation 
for a practice that favors low punitive damages ratios comports well with the 
“fair notice” rationale underlying this constitutional initiative.72 However, 
the Court’s approval of a 526:1 ratio in TXO suggests one justification 
for high-end ratios: where the defendant’s egregious action resulted in 
little actual harm but a high level of potential harm. In such circumstances, 
the numerator represents the potential harm the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct could have caused, rather than the actual harm.73 
 
 65. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 (2008). 
 66. See id. at 524 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Jill Wieber Lens, Procedural Due Process and 
Predictable Punitive Damage Awards, 2012 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 44 (suggesting that the Court’s justifications 
for adopting a 1:1 ratio may apply with equal force to its due process excessiveness jurisprudence). But 
see Grosch v. Tunica Cnty., No. 2:06CV204-P-A, 2009 WL 161856, at *16 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 22, 2009) 
(“[T]he holding in Exxon was confined to cases arising under federal admiralty law and has no 
application to the case at hand.”); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F. Supp. 2d 841, 859 (N.D. 
Iowa 2008) (“[T]he Court did not conclude that the Constitution prohibits a punitive damage award 
greater than the amount awarded for compensatory damages . . . .”); Robert L. Rabin, The Pervasive 
Role of Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and Remedies, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 431, 451 (2011) (questioning 
the potential impact of Exxon’s 1:1 ratio given the unpersuasive weakness of its rationale). 
 67. See, e.g., Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425. 
 68. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991). 
 69. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 581; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 420. 
 70. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 658.1A (2015) (treble damages for injury to real property); id. § 658.4 
(2015) (treble damages for injury to trees). 
 71. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2015) (mandating treble damages for plaintiff establishing specific parts of 
the antitrust law). 
 72. For an argument that the Court’s pursuit of objective proportionality between punitive damages 
and compensatory damages is an exercise in wrongheaded judicial activism and not of judicial restraint, 
see Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 Hastings 
L.J. 73 (2007). 
 73. See TXO Prod. Co. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 442 (1993); see also infra notes 159–77. 
and accompanying text. 
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c. Comparability to Civil Sanctions 
The comparability guidepost, which directs courts to examine relevant 
civil or criminal penalties for similar misconduct, has been the most difficult 
to apply, and therefore has proved to be the least useful of the guideposts. 
The idea behind it, however, makes perfect sense when understood against 
the due process background of an abiding concern over “fair notice,” not 
only of what misconduct will subject one to punishment, but also of the 
severity of the punishment the state may potentially impose. As Justice 
Souter reasoned in Exxon Shipping, “a penalty should be reasonably 
predictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can 
look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing 
one course of action or another.”74 The Court has repeatedly invoked this 
fundamental constitutional principle to explain the basis for its intervention 
into this historically state-law field.75 One way a would-be tortfeasor is 
put on notice that her wrongful act may potentially have serious financial 
consequences is to look to the civil or criminal sanctions that could be 
invoked to punish this type of misconduct. 
Thus, the comparability guidepost directs reviewing courts to examine 
the fines and other civil penalties, or criminal sanctions that could be 
assessed against the defendant for the same or similar misconduct, and 
then use them as a benchmark to judge the reasonableness of a particular 
punitive damages award.76 Problems in applying this guidepost mostly 
arise from the total absence of civil or criminal sanctions for the specific 
conduct at issue, lack of a close fit between the particular wrong done to 
the plaintiff and specific misconduct punished by possible civil or criminal 
sanctions, along with difficulty in deciding whether conduct outlawed and 
punished by a particular statute or regulation is truly “similar” to the 
defendant’s misconduct. Indeed, our empirical study confirms that the 
comparability guidepost is by far the least utilized by lower courts.77 
Questions have also arisen over whether it is appropriate in a comparability 
analysis to consider nonmonetary penalties, such as loss of a business or 
professional license, forfeiture of property, or disgorgement of profits.78 In 
Campbell, Justice Kennedy pointedly questioned the utility of comparisons 
to relevant criminal penalties.79 
 
 74. 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2008). 
 75. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577–78 (1996). In Campbell, Justice Kennedy 
asserted that the principle of “fair notice” finds its origins in the Magna Carta and “arises out of the basic 
unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal 
processes, but of arbitrary coercion.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003). 
 76. Gore, 517 U.S. at 576–77. 
 77. See infra Table 11. 
 78. Colleen P. Murphy, Comparison to Criminal Sanctions in the Constitutional Review of Punitive 
Damages, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1443 (2004). 
 79. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421; see also Murphy, supra note 78. 
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B. Anticipated Benefits of Excessiveness Analysis 
Gore and Campbell represent the primary repositories of information 
about why the Court created a new constitutional regime for reviewing 
punitive damages awards and what it expected lower courts to achieve by 
employing the guideposts.80 Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion in 
Gore, explained the constitutional importance of establishing legal 
standards that would provide reasonable guidance for the exercise of 
judicial discretion by a reviewing court whenever a jury awarded punitive 
damages. Such standards serve to “permit [a level of] ‘appellate review 
[that] makes certain that the punitive damages are reasonable in their 
amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred 
and to deter its repetition.’”81 Indeed, all three of the Gore guideposts 
readily find their roots in suggested standards advanced by Justice 
O’Connor in pre-Gore cases as a convenient “multipart test” that could 
be imposed on the states to achieve some meaningful rationality and 
consistency in the review of punitive damages awards.82 The Court clearly 
intended the Gore/Campbell guideposts to embody this pursuit of greater 
objectivity and consistency in lower court review of punitive damages 
awards. 
The Gore, Campbell, and Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool 
Group opinions (and, indirectly, Exxon Shipping) all fleshed out the 
expectations to be fulfilled by the three guideposts to some degree, but in 
none of the cases did the Court provide lower courts with definitive tests 
or even very precise standards for identifying arbitrary or excessive 
punitive damages awards. It is difficult to determine the Court’s precise 
expectations because the Court has conceptualized the three guideposts as 
broad and flexible standards. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly declined to 
create per se tests, embrace mathematical formulae, or otherwise cabin 
the controlling standards for identifying unconstitutionally excessive 
punitive damages awards.83 Dissenting Justices regularly take the majority 
to task for its unwillingness to be more specific about how lower courts are 
expected to determine when a punitive damages award is arbitrary or 
excessive.84 Thus, lower courts are largely left to infer the Supreme Court’s 
expectations regarding the implementation of the three guideposts based 
on comments made in earlier cases about what was constitutionally 
 
 80. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28 (1991).  
 81. Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21).  
 82. Id. 
 83. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424–25. 
 84. For example, in her dissent in Gore, Justice Ginsburg asked, “What is the Court’s measure of 
too big? Not a cap of the kind a legislature could order, or a mathematical test this Court can divine and 
impose. Too big is, in the end, the amount at which five Members of the Court bridle.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 
613 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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questionable about the heretofore open-ended review of punitive damages 
awards for arbitrariness and/or excessiveness. Although the Court has 
repeatedly declined to promulgate anything approaching a bright line 
numerical test with respect to the ratio guidepost—the only one for which 
some degree of mathematical precision might be possible—the Campbell 
ratio framework (bolstered by the apparent adoption of a 1:1 presumptive 
ratio in Exxon Shipping)85 at least shines some light on the Court’s 
understanding of acceptable ratio ranges. 
The Court has, however, articulated three distinct concerns that it 
expects the constitutionalization of punitive damages to help redress: (1) 
the absence or inadequacy of applicable external norms for judging the 
reasonableness of such awards, (2) the lack of consistency among lower 
courts in the rigor of judicial review applied to punitive damages awards, 
and (3) the perception of outlier or disproportionate punitive damages. To 
the extent that lower courts are compelled to apply a uniform constitutional 
framework in reviewing punitive damages, the guideposts certainly serve 
a channeling function by requiring all reviewing courts to apply more or 
less the same analytical process. 
As the study below suggests, lower courts have largely understood 
the standards reflected in the guideposts, although some areas cry out for 
additional clarification. With respect to consistency, the guideposts 
themselves attempt to provide semi-objective standards for assessing the 
reasonableness of specific punitive damages awards, although many 
academics regard these standards as wholly subjective and incapable of 
predictable application.86 As empirical data has suggested, the overall 
picture of punitive damages has changed little over time, with average ratios 
hovering well within a range the Court has suggested is constitutionally 
acceptable.87 But to the extent, as Exxon Shipping indicates, the Court 
has narrowed its focus on the extreme outlier awards that may be masked 
by aggregate data, lower courts may have proved less successful at reining 
in multi-million dollar awards. The Court has yet to apply its guidepost 
standards to a case with significant personal injuries and intentional 
misconduct, so many of these high value punitive awards may well pass 
 
 85. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 86. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court Needs a 
Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 774, 819 (2010) (criticizing the Court for applying 
“undefined, unprincipled, and largely subjective terms that do little or nothing to correct the arbitrary nature 
of the punitive damages that it seems to fear so greatly”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive 
Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1085, 1096 (2006) (asserting 
that “the first two guideposts consist of subjective factors that are not susceptible to principled application”). 
 87. See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages Awards: 
Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 325, 325 (2011) (discussing a body of 
empirical research that leads to general understanding “that the bulk of punitive damages awards have 
been reasonably sober, modest in size, and relatively stable over time”). 
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constitutional muster. And one of the most puzzling aspects of the 
guidepost framework is the expected interaction among the three 
guideposts, with lower courts often approving multi-million dollar punitive 
damage awards in cases involving substantial compensatory damages. 
II.  The Empirical Study: Collection and Coding Methodology 
We collected and analyzed 507 punitive damages decisions 
implementing the three guideposts from 2003 through 2013, the decade 
after Campbell was decided.88 The post-Campbell limitation was based in 
part on the theory that until Campbell reaffirmed and reinforced the 
constitutional standards introduced by Gore, lower courts might have 
been somewhat unsure about the durability of the closely-divided Gore 
holding, and therefore may have been somewhat less dedicated in their 
efforts to implement the guideposts. Studying the most recent cases also 
allowed us to focus on the most recent trends in judicial implementation 
of the guideposts by lower courts. 
The objective of our empirical research was to draw on the detailed 
information gathered in this collection of cases to reach some tentative 
conclusions on the clarity and consistency with which the nation’s lower 
courts were interpreting the three guideposts, and the efficacy of the Court’s 
stated objective of constraining arbitrary and excessively high punitive 
damages awards. In so doing, we intended to probe the soundness of 
assertions by Justice Scalia and other critics that the guideposts were so 
fundamentally flawed that, in practice, they would prove wholly unworkable 
for lower courts. We were particularly curious to learn how frequently the 
serious difficulties identified and speculated upon by critics actually arose 
when courts applied the three guideposts to real cases, and whether there 
were perhaps other unforeseen problems with the utility of the guideposts 
experienced by the lower courts charged with implementing them. 
Our selection criteria involved identifying punitive damages 
decisions issued from 2003 through 2013 by state and federal courts, 
including 298 opinions chosen for publication by the courts themselves 
and 209 unpublished opinions reported by Westlaw or Lexis. We 
acknowledge the limit of our dataset as it fails to account for a vast 
universe of unpublished punitive damages decisions.89 The selection bias 
of the courts choosing to publish the cases in our collection, and the 
 
 88. A smaller-scale study involving 200 post-Campbell cases was published in 2006, focusing primarily on 
judicial implementation of the ratio guidepost. See Lauren R. Goldman & Nickolai G. Levin, State Farm 
at Three: Lower Courts’ Application of the Ratio Guidepost, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 509 (2006). 
 89. The Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics examined a national sample of state 
court civil litigation, which found 700 tort, contract, and property cases awarding punitive damages in 
2005 alone. See Thomas H. Cohen & Kyle Harbacek, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Punitive Damage Awards 
in State Courts, 2005 at 5 (2011), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdasc05.pdf. 
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underrepresentation of state or federal courts less likely to publish cases 
generally, may skew or obscure important data regarding lower courts’ 
understanding and application of the Gore/Campbell guideposts. Given 
the constitutional inquiry required, and the often high stakes involved in 
punitive damages cases, we are nonetheless hopeful that we have captured a 
body of judicial opinions sufficiently varied and voluminous to permit some 
cautious reflections on the implementation of the constitutionally mandated 
guidepost analysis. 
The 507 opinions collected are divided fairly evenly between state 
and federal courts; 260 cases were decided by state courts and 247 cases 
were decided by federal courts. Given the much higher relative volume 
of cases in state courts, the state-federal parity in our study obviously 
reflects a significant underrepresentation of state court cases. The federal 
cases were almost evenly split between state-based claims tried in federal 
court pursuant to federal diversity jurisdiction and claims based on various 
federal statutes that permit the imposition of punitive damages. Our sample 
includes about two-thirds appellate opinions and one-third trial court 
opinions. One explanation for the imbalance is that appellate court opinions 
are more likely to be published than trial court opinions, especially in state 
cases. But the overrepresentation of appellate opinions in our study is 
also due to our elimination of published trial court opinions from the 
dataset if the case resulted in a published appellate opinion, so as to avoid 
counting the same litigation twice. 
We also classified each case by the type of substantive law claim the 
plaintiffs presented for which they sought punitive damages. Applying 
the criterion that there had to be at least fifteen cases involving a specific 
type of claim to justify a separate category, we identified fourteen major 
categories of claims for punitive damages in the ten-year period studied. 
This process produced a large fifteenth category we labeled “Other 
Cases.” Although we found a few cases applying punitive damages to a 
claim singular among our collection, several cases involved the same 
substantive claims but in numbers insufficient to meet the fifteen-case 
minimum. Table 1 lists the claim categories and the applicable number of 
cases found within. 
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Table 1: Punitive Damages Opinions by Claim Category 
Claim Category Number of Opinions 
Fraud 66 
Civil Rights 64 
Employment 56 
Business Tort 45 
Title VII 44 
Insurance 44 
Gross Negligence 24 
Property 23 
Wrongful Death 22 
Product Liability  18 
Assault and Battery 18 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty  15 




We also gathered data for each case regarding the amount of 
compensatory and punitive damages awarded by the jury and then either 
approved or remitted by the trial court and (in most of our cases) the 
applicable appellate court.90 As will be presented in greater detail below, 
our study found significantly higher punitive damage awards and higher 
median ratios of punitive to compensatory damages than those examined 
in larger scale empirical studies.91 Our study did not include an assessment 
of the effect of applicable state or federal statutory punitive damages caps 
on the lower courts’ implementation of the excessiveness guideposts.92 
To facilitate our analysis, we coded each case by identifying the court’s 
explicit utilization of each guidepost. We particularly studied the use and 
weighting of each guidepost separately, and we watched closely for 
occasions when one guidepost interacted with or reinforced (“crisscrossed,” 
to use Justice Scalia’s term93) another guidepost in the court’s application 
of the constitutional standard they represented. We noted the degree to 
which these interactions between different guideposts complicated or 
undermined the courts’ analyses, and the extent to which the guideposts 
appeared to reinforce it. We also sought evidence of factors beyond the 
three guideposts that may have affected judicial determinations about 
 
 90. See infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 91. An earlier version of this dataset covering the first nine years of the study was published as an 
appendix to Hines, supra note 42, at 407. 
 92. See generally Colleen P. Murphy, Statutory Caps and Judicial Review of Damages, 39 Akron 
L. Rev. 1001 (2006) (discussing various statutory caps on damages); see also Morton F. Daller, Tort 
Law Desk Reference: A Fifty-State Compendium (2014) (surveying state punitive damages caps). 
 93. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 606 (1996). 
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the arbitrariness or excessiveness of a punitive damages award, such as 
the defendant’s relative wealth or the presence of multiple defendants. 
Interestingly, the cases in our sample revealed no material differences 
between state and federal court utilization of the guideposts or trial and 
appellate court utilization. What follows, then, is a guidepost-by-guidepost 
assessment of how lower courts in our sample have understood and 
implemented the Court’s punitive damages excessiveness review. 
III.  Assessing the Effectiveness of the Excessiveness Guideposts 
Ever since the Gore case was decided in 1996, lower federal courts 
have consistently recognized an obligation to apply the new constitutional 
law jurisprudence, of which the three guideposts are an essential 
component, in reviewing punitive damages awards challenged as arbitrary 
or excessive. It took some state courts a little longer than federal courts, 
however, to add the guideposts to their existing judicial review standards, 
blend the guideposts into their local law requirements, or to simply 
substitute the guideposts for their former conventional analysis of punitive 
damages reasonableness.94 Nineteen years after the addition of Gore’s 
new constitutional dimension to the judicial review of punitive damages 
awards, it is rare to see a trial or appellate decision that does not expressly 
recite the three guideposts and then proceed to apply them in some 
fashion to the facts of the case before the court. 
While this national uniformity in recognizing and attempting to apply 
the same substantive standards for correcting arbitrary or excessive punitive 
damages is exactly what the Supreme Court majority clearly intended to 
achieve, it is by no means obvious that consistent results are being 
reached in seemingly similar cases, nationally or across time. This general 
observation, based on our close examination of over 500 cases, is most 
likely a function of the open-ended and under-clarified character of the 
guideposts as review standards rather than a sign of outright judicial 
resistance to the Supreme Court’s excessiveness review.95 Our clear 
impression is that the statement in a recent Kentucky Court of Appeals 
decision represents the overwhelming attitude of the nation’s lower courts 
with respect to their duty to implement the three guideposts for reviewing 
punitive damages awards: “Kentucky has faithfully and consistently traveled 
the path paved by the Supreme Court.”96 As detailed below, however, that 
path is sufficiently riddled with imprecision and lack of guidance, with 
 
 94. See, e.g., Philip Moring & Tom Dukes, A Pound of Flesh: A Primer on Punitive Damages 
Claims and Defenses Thereto, Trial Advoc. Q., Winter 2013, at 4, 4 (describing how Florida law has 
incorporated the three guideposts into judicial review of punitive damages awards). 
 95. For a fuller discussion supporting the conclusion that lower courts are neither rejecting nor resisting 
the duty to apply the emerging constitutional limits on punitive damages, see generally Hines, supra note 42. 
 96. R.O. v. A.C., 384 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). 
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respect to both inter-guidepost and intra-guidepost analyses, such that 
lower court opinions vary notably in the way they conduct what was 
expected to be a uniform excessiveness review. 
A. The Reprehensibility Guidepost 
1. Utilization of Reprehensibility Factors 
As noted earlier, reprehensibility actually plays two quite different 
roles in the constitutional analysis under the three guideposts.97 A court 
first considers whether the defendant has engaged in sufficiently 
reprehensible misconduct to justify any award of punitive damages. In 
the rare case where none of the five factors is even arguably present, 
courts have little trouble concluding that no punitive damages award is 
warranted.98 Next, a court reviews the punitive damages actually awarded 
to determine the relative degree of reprehensibility represented by the 
defendant’s misconduct. Application of this first guidepost entails 
consideration of the five Court-approved indicia of reprehensibility: (1) 
the nature of the plaintiff’s harm, (2) whether the defendant demonstrated a 
reckless disregard for plaintiff’s health or safety, (3) whether the plaintiff 
was targeted due to financial vulnerability, (4) whether the defendant 
engaged in the misconduct repeatedly, and (5) whether the defendant 
engaged in intentional malice, trickery, or deceit.99 
Some lower courts do not appear to regard an analysis of the 
cumulative degree of reprehensibility to be required, as opposed to only a 
threshold punitive determination. As Table 2 reveals, the cases in our 
study varied quite markedly in the number of these factors expressly 
analyzed. Only thirty-one percent of the cases fully applied each of the 
five factors, although forty-six percent analyzed at least four factors. A 
surprising eleven percent of the cases applied none of the factors directly, 
and twenty-four percent applied one or fewer.100 
 
 97. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Uncert-Worthiness of the Court’s Unmaking of Punitive Damages, 
2 Charleston L. Rev. 459, 495 (2008) (describing reprehensibility as “both the measure of whether 
punitive damages should be awarded and in what amount”). 
 98. See, e.g., Lewis v. Travis, Nos. 2006-CA-000531-MR, 2006-CA-000574-MR, 2006-CA-000807-
MR, 2007 WL 1893646, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 2007) (finding that defendant’s trespass on plaintiff’s 
land was neither intentional nor malicious); cf. Berkley v. Dowds, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 304, 314–17 (Ct. App. 
2007) (finding that where plaintiff’s claim did not allege a wrong for which compensatory damages were 
recoverable, no punitive damages could be awarded). 
 99. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
 100. See, e.g., Acevedo Luis v. Zayas, 419 F. Supp. 2d 115, 126 (D.P.R. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Acevedo-
Luis v. Pagan, 478 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The amount of the award of punitive damages does not welcome 
extensive comment.”); Carey v. Johnson, No. M2002-00911-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21439039, at *3 
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2003) (describing the conduct as “intentional and outrageous” but applying 
no other factors). 
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Table 2: Utilization of Five Reprehensibility  














Fraud 6 8 8 5 12 27 
Civil Rights 10 8 12 17 6 11 
Employment 7 12 5 6 10 16 
Business Tort 7 4 1 3 4 22 
Title VII 2 9 10 5 7 11 
Insurance 0 8 5 3 7 22 
Gross Negligence 3 1 6 5 6 3 
Property 3 3 6 3 3 5 
Wrongful Death 2 1 5 4 4 6 
Product Liability 2 1 2 2 5 6 
Assault & Battery 1 1 6 4 2 4 
Br. Fiduc. Duty 1 2 2 4 3 3 
Creditor Abuse 1 3 1 2 2 6 
Defamation 1 1 5 3 3 4 













Some claim categories, such as business torts and insurance, show close 
to two-thirds of cases assessing every factor and a lower than average 
number of cases applying none. Other claim categories come in well below 
the average of cases applying all five factors, such as civil rights at seventeen 
percent, or above the average in applying only one or fewer factors, such 
as employment at thirty-four percent. These discrepancies among claim 
categories may be due to the illustrative clarity of each factor in the 
context of commercial claims like those in Gore and Campbell, and the 
converse lack of Supreme Court guidance regarding a multitude of claims 
involving physical,101 constitutional, dignitary, or employment-related harms. 
Some of the factors are more highly utilized than others, as indicated 
in Table 3. The factor courts most often considered was whether the 
defendant’s conduct reflected malicious or deceitful intent. The intent 
factor was analyzed in eighty-two percent of the cases in our study and 
affirmatively found in sixty-eight percent of the cases. Courts in our sample 
examined the repeated nature of the defendant’s conduct in fifty-seven 
percent of the cases and found that heightened signs of reprehensibility 
in forty-three percent of the cases.  
 
 101. The Court passed up two opportunities to consider the significance of physical harm in assessing 
the excessiveness of a punitive damages award when it focused first on procedural due process rather 
than excessiveness in Williams, and then dismissed its second grant of certiorari in the case after the 
Oregon Supreme Court declined to reduce the $79 million award on remand. 
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Characterization of plaintiff’s harm as either physical or economic 
comes in at a surprisingly low fifty-nine percent, given that it appears to 
be one of the easiest of the factors to apply. This likely reflects courts’ 
implicit consideration of the harm at issue rather than rejection of the 
notion that some harms reflect relatively more reprehensibility than others. 
Courts have also balked at the Supreme Court’s apparently binary mode 
of analysis of this factor, physical or economic. Instead, courts often chose to 
rank certain harms, for example those of a constitutional or emotional 
nature, higher than mere economic harm, if perhaps less culpable than 
physical harm.102 The Court in Campbell not only declined to find the 
plaintiff’s emotional harm to be physical,103 it concluded that the portion 
of plaintiff’s compensatory award representing emotional distress included 
duplicative punitive elements that militated toward remittitur of the 
punitive damages award.104 
Table 3: Utilization and Application of Reprehensibility  
Factors in Sample 
Reprehensibility Factor Number of Cases 
Physical v. Economic Harm to Plaintiff 300 (59%)
     Physical Harm 117 (23%) 
     Economic Harm 183 (36%) 
Reckless Disregard of Health/Safety 311 (61%)
     Reckless Disregard Found 163 (32%) 
     No Reckless Disregard Found 148 (29%) 
Target of Misconduct Financially Vulnerable 193 (38%)
     Plaintiff Financially Vulnerable 116 (23%) 
     Plaintiff Not Financially Vulnerable 77 (15%) 
Repeated v. Isolated Misconduct 291 (57%)
     Repeated Conduct 216 (43%) 
     Isolated Conduct 75 (15%) 
Intentional Malice, Trickery, or Deceit 415 (82%)
     Malice, Trickery, or Deceit Found 343 (68%) 
     No Malice, Trickery, or Deceit Found 72 (14%) 
 
 102. See, e.g., Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon, Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1319 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that the loss of use and enjoyment of municipal property “cannot adequately be characterized as solely 
economic”); O’Lee v. Compuware Corp., No. A111774, 2007 WL 963450, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 
2007) (describing the harm caused by attack on plaintiffs’ reputation as “well beyond mere economic 
harm”); Hirsh v. Lecuona, No. 8:06CV13, 2008 WL 2795859, at *9 (D. Neb. July 18, 2008) (“With respect 
to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the court finds that, although the harm inflicted on the 
plaintiff was largely economic as opposed to physical, the plaintiff suffered a significant loss as well as the 
intangible and abstract injury of infringement of a constitutional right.”). 
 103. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426 (finding that emotional distress was not a “physical injury” because 
“[t]he harm arose from a transaction in the economic realm, not from some physical assault or trauma”). 
 104. See id. (finding that compensatory damages for emotional distress “likely were based on a 
component which was duplicated in the punitive award”). 
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Finding the requisite reprehensibility can sometimes involve a degree 
of creative interpretation of the five factors in cases where, on the surface, it 
appears some of them do not readily apply. Some courts, for example, have 
broadly interpreted the second factor, reckless disregard for health and 
safety, to include plaintiff’s “peace of mind” or “mental well-being,” again 
seeking to hold more culpable misconduct that results in emotional, 
dignitary, or constitutional injuries rather than physical ones.105 A number of 
courts have expanded upon the financial vulnerability factor. Some have 
interpreted the factor to require only that the defendant be aware of the 
plaintiff’s financial vulnerability rather than having deliberately targeted the 
plaintiff due to that condition.106 Others have suggested that most employees 
are inherently financially vulnerable to the misconduct of an employer.107 
Still other courts have expanded on the concept of financial vulnerability 
itself to include other types of vulnerable plaintiffs, such as immigrants,108 
children,109 the elderly,110 victims of police abuse,111 and people suffering from 
poor health112 or mental disability.113 Consequently, beyond the 116 cases in 
 
 105. See, e.g., Ojeda-Rodriguez v. Zayas, 666 F. Supp. 2d 240, 265 (D.P.R. 2009) (explaining that if the 
concept of risk to health and safety “were adapted to the ‘constitutional tort’ context from the traditional 
tort context in which it evolved, then the court could ask whether [the defendant’s] conduct evinced an 
indifference or reckless disregard of [plaintiff’s] right to due process”); Omari v. Kindred Healthcare 
Operating, Inc., No. B185113, 2007 WL 1640958, at *18 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2007) (asserting that “the 
second factor does not involve physical health alone, and may consist of an assault on the peace of mind of 
the plaintiff, without regard to the effect on his or her mental health”); O’Lee v. Compuware Corp., 2007 WL 
963450, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2007) (emotional distress caused by defendant’s attack on plaintiffs’ 
reputations “did not impact plaintiffs’ safety, but in a real sense it could be said to have impacted plaintiffs’ 
health and well being”); Century Sur. Co. v. Polisso, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 499 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that 
bad faith denial of insurance benefits showed indifference to plaintiffs’ health and “peace of mind”). 
 106. See, e.g., Hrobuchak v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:03 CV 0591, 2004 WL 3333124, 
at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2004) (citing as “especially reprehensible” defendant’s conduct given its awareness 
of plaintiffs’ financial difficulties). 
 107. See, e.g., Styers v. Pa., No. 1:CV-05-2127, 2008 WL 598285, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2008) 
(“[W]hile not financially vulnerable, [the plaintiff] was a vulnerable target because [the defendant] had 
control over [his] ability to qualify as a Pilot-in-Command of the PSP helicopter.”); Parexel Int’l Corp. 
v. Feliciano, No. 04-cv-3798, 2008 WL 5101642 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008); Roby v. McKesson HBOC, 
53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558, 563 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 108. See, e.g., Lopez v. Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 914, 971 (N.D. Iowa 
2006). 
 109. See, e.g., Ondrisek v. Hoffman, 698 F.3d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir. 2012); Henley v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 71 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 110. See, e.g., Hull v. Ability Ins. Co., No. CV–10–116–BLG–RFC, 2012 WL 6083614, at *3 (D. Mont. 
Dec. 6, 2012) (emphasizing “the undisputable fact that the elderly are particularly vulnerable”). 
 111. See, e.g., Mendez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing 
vulnerability in the context of abuse of police power). 
 112. See, e.g., Chopra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 230, 244 (D. Conn. 2007) (“Defendant’s 
acts are rendered more reprehensible by the fact that [he] was aware that plaintiff required dialysis 
[and had a] fragile health condition . . . .”). 
 113. See, e.g., Payne v. Jones, 696 F.3d 189, 201 (2d Cir. 2012) (describing awareness of plaintiff’s 
mental illness to be “an aggravating factor”). 
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our study expressly finding the plaintiff financially vulnerable, courts 
characterized the plaintiff as nonetheless “vulnerable” (and the misconduct 
at issue more reprehensible) in an additional thirty cases, increasing the 
total number of cases finding plaintiff vulnerability from twenty-three 
percent to twenty-nine percent.  
The Supreme Court has flagged for concern awards of punitive 
damages based only on one or few indicia of reprehensibility, but has shed 
little light on the relative importance of each factor or various combinations 
thereof.114 In a few rare cases in our sample, the defendant’s wrongdoing 
was so egregious and pervasive that the court determined that each of the 
five factors pointed to a high degree of reprehensibility.115 Cases in which the 
court found three or four of the reprehensibility factors present still almost 
always yielded approval of the punitive damages award.116 Interestingly, 
some courts concluded that even though none of the five factors were 
clearly present, the defendant’s misconduct was nonetheless sufficiently 
reprehensible to justify the awarding of punitive damages anyway.117 
Although the Court has offered little clarity on the interaction among 
factors, lower courts nonetheless must regularly assess reprehensibility in 
cases where some factors point one way and others point in the opposite 
direction.118 In American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Mieli, for 
example, the district court considered a case where some reprehensibility 
factors pointed in different directions.119 The Mieli case involved fraudulent 
insurance claims for hail damage to roofs on 145 buildings owned by the 
defendant. A jury found for the insurance company, awarding $887,000 
in compensatory damages for breach of contract and fraudulent 
 
 114. See Zipursky, supra note 42, at 1001 (“[T]he Court has never provided clear guidance on how 
courts should tailor the amount of punitive damages to the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct. 
This lack of guidance is an important failure because juries generally agree on the reprehensibility of a 
given act but cannot effectively translate that agreement into a dollar amount.”); Hubbard, supra note 
4, at 364 (complaining that the reprehensibility factors are “vague, they can conflict with one another, 
and the presence or absence of one or all the factors is not determinative”). 
 115. See, e.g., Eden Elect. Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F. 3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming $10 
million punitive award, with the court stating that it could “hardly think of a more reprehensible case 
of business fraud”). 
 116. See, e.g., McLemore ex rel. McLemore v. Elizabethton Med. Inv., Ltd. P’ship, 389 S.W.3d 764, 
786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that the defendant was highly reprehensible as “three of the five 
considerations for reprehensibility listed in Campbell were present”); Innovative Tech. Corp. v. Advance 
Mgmt. Tech., No. 23819, 2011 WL 5137204, at *19 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2011) (finding four of the five 
factors justified a “substantial award of punitive damages” for the economic harm caused); Romania v. 
Volk, No. 08-6229-AA, 2009 WL 4823390, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 11, 2009) (finding that “two, perhaps 
three reprehensible factors [were] met, making defendant’s conduct ‘moderately reprehensible’”). 
 117. See, e.g., Saunders v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142, 152–53 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 118. See, e.g., Roby v. McKesson HBOC, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that the relevant 
factors “offset” each other leaving a “neutral result,” but nevertheless finding sufficient reprehensibility 
to affirm a $2 million punitive damage award for wrongful discharge plaintiff). 
 119. 569 F. Supp. 2d 841, 858 (N.D. Iowa 2008).  
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misrepresentation, and $1,017,332 in punitive damages.120 In applying the 
three guideposts to review the punitive damages award for unconstitutional 
excessiveness, the court started with the five reprehensibility factors. It 
noted that three factors favored the defendant’s position—the harm was 
solely economic, no reckless disregard was shown for the health or safety 
of others, and there was no financial vulnerability present—but the other 
two factors strongly favored the plaintiff’s position—defendant’s deliberate 
acts of fraud were repeated many times, and defendant’s actions clearly 
involved “trickery” in the form of numerous phony repair bills from 
nonexistent contractors. Citing an earlier Eighth Circuit case with a similar 
distribution of reprehensibility factors,121 the court upheld the jury’s 
finding of reprehensibility—and the 1.85:1 ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages. 
2. Additional Reprehensibility Considerations 
Two other aspects of the reprehensibility guidepost bear brief 
consideration: the nuanced role of conduct that harms others and the 
impact of defendant’s profit motive on the assessment of reprehensibility. 
As discussed earlier, Williams occupied a good bit of the Court’s time during 
the prior decade.122 The main issue addressed by the Court in that case 
concerned whether jurors could consider harms to individuals other than 
the plaintiff in establishing a punitive damages award that properly 
punished the defendant’s reprehensible misconduct and deterred it in the 
future. Although it did not explain exactly how the trial judge is supposed to 
“unring” this bell, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Williams clearly drew 
a sharp line between allowing inquiry into harms to others in the state in 
determining the degree of reprehensibility, and taking such harms into 
account in setting the punitive damages award. 
This is a sufficiently complicated bifurcation of the degree of harm 
information a jury is allowed to consider that we expected this problem 
to appear in a number of the lower court cases we reviewed, but we found 
only ten cases (less than two percent) post-Williams that addressed harm 
to others,123 including the remand to the Oregon Supreme Court in Williams 
itself.124 In one case focusing directly on the Williams issue, an Idaho court 
found no due process violation, even though the jury was instructed that 
its reprehensibility analysis could consider similar harms to others both in 
 
 120. Id. at 853 n.12. 
 121. Diesel Mach., Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 829, 839–40 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 122. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 556 U.S. 178 (2009). 
 123. One case where the issue was raised resulted in a determination that was much like Williams, where 
the appellate court refused to consider the claim because the defendant had not preserved the proper 
objection in the court below. See Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 538 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 124. Williams v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1255 (Or. 2008). 
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Idaho and nationally.125 In another case, the defendant argued the “harms to 
others” issue to the appellate court, but the court refused to consider it 
because, as in Williams, the issue had not been properly preserved at the 
trial stage.126 The significance of harm to others may yet reemerge as a 
thorny reprehensibility issue, but for now courts may simply be letting 
the dust settle from the saga of Williams. 
Another aspect of defendant conduct identified as having a negative 
impact on the degree of reprehensibility is whether the misconduct was 
motivated by profit. The Court in Exxon characterized the profitability 
of misconduct as warranting a higher level of reprehensibility,127 although 
it did not find that the company engaged in profit seeking misconduct. 
Consideration of the profit motivation behind defendant’s bad actions 
may be best understood as simply a variation on the intentional malice 
and deceit factor rather than a stand-alone reprehensibility factor itself. 
Lower courts in our sample cited the profitability of defendant’s misconduct 
in forty-six or nine percent of cases.128 This factor is sometimes discussed 
alongside consideration of defendant’s wealth, a topic that will be further 
addressed below. 
B. The Ratio Guidepost 
As described earlier, in reviewing punitive damages awards, most 
courts focus a great deal of attention on the stark numerical relationship 
between punitive and compensatory damages. Lower courts appear 
particularly comfortable with this stage of the review process. Perhaps 
working with numbers and ratios gives the judges conducting the review 
process a sense of mathematical firmness that the narrative criteria of the 
other two guideposts lack. Generally, the numerator in the ratio fraction 
called for by the ratio guidepost is the amount of money the plaintiff is 
receiving to compensate for the losses suffered. In some cases, the Supreme 
Court has allowed lower courts calculating the ratio to substitute for the 
compensatory damages awarded a figure representing their best estimate 
of the potential harm that might have been caused by the defendant’s 
conduct.129 
 
 125. See Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Co., 233 P.3d 1221, 1259–62 (Idaho 2010). 
 126. See Flax, 272 S.W.3d 521. 
 127. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494 (2008) (“Action taken or omitted in order to 
augment profit represents an enhanced degree of punishable culpability . . . .”). 
 128. See, e.g., Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1185 (D. Nev. 2008) (finding 
highly reprehensible that “[d]efendants have reaped hundreds of millions of dollars if not more in benefit 
from engaging in the conduct”); Tanner v. Ebbole, 88 So. 3d 856, 870, 876–77 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). 
 129. This is arguably the message of the TXO decision, where a ratio of 526:1 with respect to 
compensatory damages was approved because the evidence showed a huge potential harm would have 
been inflicted on the plaintiff if the defendant’s wrongful scheme had not been thwarted. TXO Prod. 
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993). 
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On whatever basis the operative ratio is constructed, the reviewing 
court is then tasked with producing a ratio and determining whether that 
ratio is constitutionally sustainable, considering all the relevant factors in 
the case. In some jurisdictions, as addressed below, calculating the ratio 
numerator can raise issues about what will be included beyond the 
compensatory amounts actually awarded.130 Once the figure serving as the 
numerator in the ratio fraction is established, factors commonly considered 
in determining the reasonableness of the ratio include the general guidance 
provided by the Supreme Court opinions regarding appropriate ratios, the 
absolute size of the compensatory damages award (either very large or very 
small), whether the compensatory award already includes some punitive 
element, the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the 
relative wealth of the defendant, and other more speculative factors. 
Lower courts regularly advert to discussions found in the leading 
Supreme Court opinions about how they should determine constitutionally 
permissible ratios, and frequently emphasize that the Court has consistently 
declined invitations to turn the ratio guidepost into a purely mathematical 
exercise.131 The Court’s clearly stated preference for “single digit” ratios 
is often cited as providing constitutional cover for ratios below 10:1. In 
McClain v. Metabolife International Inc., for example, a federal district 
court in Alabama explained its understanding of Campbell thusly: 
If the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages exceeds 9 (the highest 
possible single digit), a red flag goes up. . . . Assuming arguendo that a 
multiplier of 9 or less means that the punitive damages presumptively 
passes muster under the Due Process Clause, Metabolife’s challenges 
to most of the punitive damage awards in this case are eliminated.132  
Other courts hone in on the Court’s suggestion in Haslip that ratios 
exceeding 4:1 may raise constitutional excessiveness concerns.133 The Court’s 
admonition in Campbell that very high compensatory damages awards 
may call for ratios no greater than 1:1, as discussed below, has been quite 
inconsistently applied.134  
 
 130. See infra notes 178–82 and accompanying text. In some jurisdictions, such “add-ons” as 
prejudgment interest and attorney fees are included in compensatory damages to which the punitive 
damages award is compared. 
 131. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (No “bright line ratio,” 
which a punitive damages award cannot exceed); but see Rustad, supra note 97, at 491 (“The State Farm 
Court comes perilously close to developing a per se mathematically-based test as a surrogate for the 
reasonable punitive damages award . . . .”). 
 132. See McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2003). 
 133. See, e.g., Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 308–10 (Tex. 2007) (citing 
Haslip in finding punitive ratio of 4.33:1 to exceed constitutional limits).  
 134. For an interesting discussion (with a well-argued dissent) about whether small versus large 
compensatory awards necessitate different analyses of the ratio issue, see Hamlin v. Hampton Lumber 
Mills, 246 P.3d 1121, 1124–28 (Or. 2011). 
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Most judges emphasize that the Supreme Court has not set forth firm 
rules, but rather has provided only guiding principles that provide a “rough 
framework” for determining the appropriate ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory recovery.135 As one federal judge described this flexible 
interpretation, “the Supreme Court’s guideposts are just that: guideposts.”136 
1. Aggregate Ratio Data 
Our collection of cases produced significantly higher awards than those 
reported in large empirical studies on punitive damages, which have found 
overall median punitive damages awards less than $64,000.137 As indicated in 
Table 4, even with post-remittitur and post-appeal adjustments, our cases 
show an aggregate median punitive damages award of $460,500. While in 
some claim categories the median punitive amount is less than that overall 
median, none of the claims show medians approaching the aggregate data 
found in wide-scale empirical studies of punitive damages cases. 






Fraud $500,000 $353,895 
Civil Rights $250,000 $100,000 
Employment $975,000 $480,000 
Business Tort $2,250,000 $500,000 
Title VII $500,000 $290,000 
Insurance $3,000,000 $1,325,000 
Gross Negligence $749,362 $500,000 
Property $350,000 $150,000 
Wrongful Death $5,250,000 $4,183,000 
Product Liability $15,607,000 $10,000,000 
Assault and Battery $275,000 $200,000 
Br. Fiduc. Duty $2,000,000 $1,647,000 
Creditor Abuse $250,000 $260,000 
Defamation $250,000 $250,000 
Other $500,000 $365,952 
Total $829,197 $460,500 
Similarly, as shown in Table 5, the total punitive damages awarded in 
our sample reflect significantly higher amounts than in the mine run of cases 
included in empirical studies. The Department of Justice’s 2011 report on 
tort, contract, and property cases awarding punitive damages in state courts, 
 
 135. See Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1189 (D. Nev. 2008). 
 136. Noble Biomaterials v. Argentum Med., LLC, No. 3:08-CV-1305, 2011 WL 4458796, at *8 (M.D. 
Pa. Sept. 23, 2011). 
 137. See Cohen & Harbacek, supra note 89, at 50. 
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for example, found only thirteen percent of punitive damage awards at or 
over $1,000,000, but thirty-six percent of our cases involved punitive 
damages of $1,000,000 or more.138 Indeed, fourteen percent of the punitive 
damage awards in our sample exceeded $5,000,000, and two percent were 
over $50,000,000. According to one scholar, a punitive award does not 
achieve “blockbuster” status until it reaches $100,000,000;139 our sample 
included fourteen such initial blockbuster awards, or 2.8 percent. Eight of 
those awards were reduced on appeal to an amount less than $100,000,000, 
but in six cases (one percent of our total) the awards remained over that 
amount even after district or appellate court remittitur. 
Table 5: Amount of Punitive Damages Awards in Sample 
Punitive Damages Award Original Award Post-Review Award 
$1,000–$99,999 83 (16%) 124 (24%) 
$100,000–$499,999 124 (24%) 147 (29%) 
$500,000–$999,999 52 (10%) 54 (11%) 
$1,000,000–$4,999,999 131 (26%) 112 (22%) 
$5,000,000–$9,999,999 41 (8%) 28 (6%) 
$10,000,000–$49,999,999 51 (10%) 30 (6%) 
Over $50,000,000 25 (5%) 12 (2%) 
Because scholars have reported a significant empirical correlation 
between the size of compensatory damage awards and punitive damages,140 
Table 6 sets forth the distribution and amount of compensatory damages 
awarded in our cases. Twenty-one percent of these cases involved 
compensatory amounts of $1,000,000 or more, a sum that the Court in 
Campbell characterized as “substantial” enough to warrant consideration 
of a 1:1 ratio.141 
  
 
 138. Id. 
 139. W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 Emory L.J. 1405, 1408 (2004) 
(stating $100,000,000 “blockbuster” threshold is necessary because although “$1 million awards used to 
generate media coverage for a substantial award, we now live in an era in which there may be award levels of 
a billion dollars or even more”). 
 140. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical 
Study, 2 J. Legal Analysis 577, 600 (2010) (showing a “general pattern of increasing rates of punitive 
awards as the compensatory award increases”). 
 141. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426–27 (2003). 
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Table 6: Amount of Compensatory Damages Awards in Sample 
Compensatory Damages Award Original Award Post-Review Award 
$1–$999 45 (9%) 45 (9%) 
$1,000–$9,999 54 (11%) 55 (11%) 
$10,000–$99,999 109 (22%) 120 (24%) 
$100,000–$499,999 136 (27%) 131 (26%) 
$500,000–$999,999 52 (10%) 50 (10%) 
$1,000,000–$9,999,999 90 (18%) 85 (17%) 
Over $10,000,000 21 (4%) 21 (4%) 
The significantly higher median punitive damages awards found in 
our sample can likely be explained by the selection bias of courts or legal 
databases choosing to publish cases featuring a large absolute amount of 
punitive damages or particularly high ratios of punitive to compensatory 
damages. Our sample does not capture a huge universe of unpublished cases 
that clearly involve comparatively much lower punitive damages amounts or 
ratios. That selection bias may nonetheless be useful in gauging how lower 
courts approach the excessiveness review in the very high dollar category 
of cases about which the Supreme Court appears most concerned. 
With respect to the ratios of punitive to compensatory damages found 
in our sample, our data again reveals a significantly higher median ratio than 
in larger scale reported empirical studies that have found median ratios 
below 1.0.142 As set forth in Table 7, the original ratio median across all 
claims is 5.87, but the post-trial or post-appeal median ratio is still 3.95. 
While some claim categories show remitted median ratios slightly lower 
or higher than 3.95, none approaches the median .62 ratio discussed by 
Justice Souter in Exxon143 or the .88–.98 ratio found by a prominent punitive 
damages scholar.144  
 
 142. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical 
Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 754 (2002). 
 143. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497–98, n.14 (2008) (surveying empirical 
research finding the median ratio to be as low as .62:1 and concluding that “by most accounts the median 
ratio of punitive to compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1”). 
 144. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 142, at 754 (finding median ratios of .88–.98). 
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Table 7: Median Punitive Damages Ratios in Sample 





Fraud 5.51 4.17 
Civil Rights 9.64 3.00 
Employment 5.33 4.00 
Business Tort 4.89 3.00 
Title VII 5.54 2.00 
Insurance 10.04 4.00 
Gross Negligence 5.49 3.00 
Property 5.09 5.00 
Wrongful Death 8.50 4.00 
Product Liability 4.18 2.40 
Assault and Battery 8.66 4.10 
Br. Fiduc. Duty 4.23 2.23 
Creditor Abuse 5.00 3.25 
Defamation 7.58 3.33 
Other 5.00 3.86 
Total 5.87 3.95 
Tables 8 and 9 display the pattern of ratios between punitive damages 
and compensatory damages pre- and post-review in each claim category 
across ten years of published lower court opinions. The highest ratio 
reported in our sample was 5,000,000:1;145 the lowest was 0.02:1.146 The 
Tables classify ratios by five ranges: less than 1:1, 1:1 to 4:0, 4:1 to 9.9:1, 
10:1 to 99.9, and 100:1 or higher.  
  
 
 145. See Lawnwood Med. Ctr. v. Sadow, 43 So. 3d 710, 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming 
punitive award of $5 million where compensatory damages award was $1 in defamation case). 
 146. See USA Commercial Mortg. Co. v. Compass USA SPE LLC, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1154 (D. 
Nev. 2011) (awarding $50,000 in punitive damages compared to $2.5 million in compensatory damages 
and attorney’s fees). 
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Table 8: Original Ratios by Claim Category 
Claim Category 
Less 
Than 1:1 1:1–4:0 4.1:1–9.9:1 10:1–99.9:1 
Over 
100:1 
Fraud 4 25 14 18 5 
Civil Rights 9 13 10 13 19 
Employment 4 19 10 17 6 
Business Tort 4 14 9 8 6 
Title VII 3 14 11 10 6 
Insurance 1 15 6 19 4 
Gross Negligence 5 6 6 7 0 
Property 3 8 3 5 4 
Wrongful Death 2 7 2 10 1 
Product Liability 1 8 3 5 1 
Assault & Battery 1 5 3 8 1 
Br. Fiduc. Duty 0 7 7 1 0 
Creditor Abuse 1 4 6 4 0 
Defamation 3 3 3 3 5 
Other 5 11 11 6 6 


















Fraud 4 33 20 7 2 
Civil Rights 11 20 11 6 16 
Employment 4 27 12 9 4 
Business Tort 4 23 7 5 2 
Title VII 9 19 5 7 4 
Insurance 1 25 13 5 1 
Gross Negligence 5 11 5 3 0 
Property 3 9 5 2 4 
Wrongful Death 2 9 4 6 1 
Product Liability 1 11 4 2 0 
Assault & Battery 0 8 4 5 1 
Br. Fiduc. Duty 0 10 5 0 0 
Creditor Abuse 1 7 5 2 0 
Defamation 3 6 2 1 5 












Again, while the Department of Justice’s report on state court punitive 
damages in tort, contract, and property cases found that seventy-six 
percent involved punitive damages ratios below 3:1, the ratio distribution 
in our sample is different. Only eleven percent of our cases fell under 1:1, 
and only fifty-eight percent of our cases reflected ratios at or below the 
4:1 “benchmark” suggested by some of the Court’s dicta. In 152, or thirty 
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percent of our cases, courts expressly noted the constitutional acceptability 
of such a 1:1–4:1 ratio.147 Twenty-two percent of the cases in our study 
yielded ratios greater than 4:1 and less than 10:1, the magic “single digit” 
level suggested by the Court as the presumptive upper limit of cases 
without mitigating circumstances. Indeed, courts in seventy-nine (sixteen 
percent) of the cases in our study explicitly invoked the Court’s alleged 
blessing of ratios below double digits. 
Thirty-nine percent of the original jury ratios in our cases exceeded 
10:1, although the marked effect of judicial review at both the trial and 
appellate level can be seen by the reduction of such double or triple digit 
ratios to twenty percent of cases post-review. Even after judicial review, 
a notable nine percent of our cases reflected ratios in excess of 100:1. The 
lion’s share of those awards resulted from civil rights cases, however, 
where high degrees of reprehensibility coupled with low or even nominal 
compensatory damages awards can readily achieve triple digit ratios. 
To get a little more of the flavor of how the ratio guidepost operates, 
consider four recent illustrative cases. In Hancock v. Variyam,148 the plaintiff 
was a physician who claimed he had been defamed by the defendant, 
another physician who publically disparaged plaintiff’s professional skill. 
The jury ruled for the plaintiff and awarded $90,000 in compensatory 
damages and $85,000 in punitive damages (.94:1 ratio). The Texas Court 
of Appeals upheld the punitive damages award as reasonable under the 
circumstances and clearly consistent with the ratio guidepost. 
Illustrating a classic less than 4:1 ratio, in Allstate Insurance Company v. 
Dodson,149 the plaintiff sued the insurance company defendant for 
defamation and tortious interference with business expectancy. The jury 
sided with plaintiff, awarding $6 million in compensatory damages and 
$15 million in punitive damages (a 2.5:1 ratio).150 The trial judge ordered 
a remitter of the punitive damages award down to $6 million (a 1:1 
ratio).151 On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the ratio 
guidepost and restored the punitive damages award to $15 million, noting 
that the ratio was still less than 4:1.152 
In Brim v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,153 the plaintiff sued the 
defendant, a credit agency, for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
 
 147. See, e.g., Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 
2004) (rejecting argument that Campbell dictated a 1:1 ratio in comparable bad faith insurance case, court 
pointed out that “[t]he ratio in this case is approximately 2.6:1, well within the Supreme Court’s suggested 
range for constitutional punitive damages”). 
 148. 345 S.W.3d 157, 161–62 (Tex. App. 2011). 
 149. 2011 Ark. 19, at 1, 376 S.W.3d 414, 418. 
 150. Id. at 4, 376 S.W. 3d at 419. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 28, 376 S.W. 3d at 432. 
 153. 795 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1255 (N.D. Ala. 2011). 
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The jury awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in compensatory damages and 
$623,180 in punitive damages (a 6.23:1 ratio).154 The federal district court 
for the Northern District of Alabama applied the ratio guidepost and 
upheld the punitive damages award. In support of its decision, the court 
specifically cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s “jurisprudential preference” 
for single-digit punitive awards.155 
Finally, in Sepulveda v. Burnside,156 the plaintiff sued state prison 
officials for repeated violations of Eighth Amendment rights. The jury 
awarded plaintiff $1 in compensatory damages and $99,999 in punitive 
damages (a 99,999:1 ratio).157 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the punitive 
damages award, noting that the violations of plaintiff’s rights were very 
serious and reprehensible; therefore the jury’s punitive damages award 
was reasonable, even though the ratio was much higher than any ratio 
ever upheld before in the Eleventh Circuit. The opinion emphasized that 
no precise mathematical formula exists for evaluating an award’s 
justification.158 
2. Determining the Proper Numerator and Denominator 
Given the crucial role of proportionality in the excessiveness analysis, 
it is not surprising to find lower courts grappling with exactly which values 
to include in both sides of the ratio calculus. The greatest uncertainty 
surrounds the determination of the numerator (actual harm) side of the 
punitive damages-to-compensatory-award calculus. In TXO,159 the Court 
established the proposition that where proper factual grounds are found 
to exist, a lower court may utilize as the ratio numerator a dollar value 
reflecting the potential harm that might have been suffered by the plaintiff 
rather than the compensatory damages award representing the actual harm 
to plaintiff.160 Typically, this consideration of potential harm arises in 
cases of alleged economic harm where, had the defendant’s unlawful 
scheme succeeded, the plaintiff would have suffered a much greater 
economic loss than what actually occurred.161 Although the constitutional 
standard in the ratio guidepost is always stated in terms of “actual or 
potential harm,”162 the overwhelming majority of cases in our dataset only 
 
 154. Id. at 1263. 
 155. Id. at 1264. 
 156. 432 F. App’x 860 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 157. Id. at 861. 
 158. Id. at 866. 
 159. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453 (1993). 
 160. See generally Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 83 (2007). 
 161. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 460 (finding TXO’s fraudulent scheme could have caused millions of 
dollars in damages if the wrongful plan had succeeded). 
 162. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 420 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996); TXO, 509 U.S. at 460; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991). 
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utilized the actual compensatory damages awarded as the appropriate 
basis for reviewing proportionality in the ratio guidepost. Courts expressly 
included calculation of potential harms in only twenty-nine (six percent) 
of the cases in our study. 
Bennett v. Reynolds163 provides a good illustration of how much 
difference it can make when the reviewing court applies a “potential 
harm” analysis. In Bennett, the jury awarded $5327 in actual damages 
against Bennett and the Bonham Corporation jointly and severally, 
$250,000 in punitive damages against Bennett, and $1 million in punitive 
damages against Bonham.164 The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the 47:1 
ratio against Bennett and the 187:1 ratio against Bonham Corporation, 
expressly applying the potential harm analysis.165 During the trial, Bennett 
testified that to settle the matter he would willingly pay the plaintiff 
$500,000 for mental anguish as a result of the defendant falsely accusing 
the plaintiff of theft of cattle. This amount, however, was not included in 
the actual damages awarded to the plaintiff by the jury.166 TXO and 
Campbell both suggested that in the proper case, the ratio numerator 
could be based on the potential harm likely to have resulted from the 
defendants’ conduct.167 Therefore, the court calculated the potential harm at 
$500,000, which reduced the ratios to 0.5:1 for Bennett and to 2:1 for 
Bonham.168 
Additionally, the court noted that the defendant’s testimony was 
significant because it bore on the “fair notice” concerns that are the 
ultimate rationale for the due process analysis.169 On appeal, the Texas 
Supreme Court disagreed, invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s metaphor 
of constructing a “constitutional fence around exemplary damages” to 
rule that the award in this case was neither reasonable nor proportionate 
to the wrong committed.170 The case was remanded back to the court of 
appeals for a fresh assessment of the appropriate size of the punitive 
damages award.171 The Texas Supreme Court ignored the lower court’s 
ruling that the large potential harm from the defendant’s wrongful action 
found to be $500,000, to which the defendant acquiesced, was the correct 
ratio numerator. 
Another example of how potential harm may come into play to 
support setting a ratio numerator higher than actual harm is provided by the 
 
 163. 242 S.W.3d 866, 905 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 164. Id. at 876. 
 165. Id. at 906–07. 
 166. Id. at 877–78. 
 167. Id. at 905 (citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424). 
 168. Id. at 905–06. 
 169. Id. at 906. 
 170. Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 885 (Tex. 2010). 
 171. Id. 
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2008 case of Parexel International Corp. v. Feliciano.172 There, an employee 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had ordered him to engage in illegal 
conduct by acquiring certain marketing secrets from a competitor.173 
When the plaintiff refused, defendant fired him.174 Giving effect to the 
potential harm concept, the federal district court considered how acceding 
to defendant’s unlawful demand would have ruined plaintiff’s reputation 
and made him unemployable in the industry. The court held that the 
potential harm to plaintiff went well beyond the compensatory damages 
awarded to him for the actual harm he suffered, and affirmed the $1.7 
million punitive damages award using the potential harm figure as the 
ratio numerator.175 
The potential harm analysis was also approved and applied in a 
recent Iowa case involving a successful bad faith claim against a casualty 
insurer.176 In Deters v. USF Insurance Co., the Iowa Court of Appeals relied 
on what it determined to be the $1 million potential harm to plaintiff to 
uphold the $1 million punitive damages awarded when defendant insurance 
company, in bad faith, refused to defend a claim against plaintiff. The 
compensatory damages awarded in the case were only $69,000.177 
Employment cases can also pose challenges in the determination of 
the correct numerator, because monetary awards sometimes include back 
or front pay amounts not considered “compensatory” in nature. In Chopra 
v. General Electric Co., for example, the court agreed that the employee’s 
back pay should be included in determining the actual harm numerator, 
but then calculated the ratio both with and without the award of front pay 
in considering the excessiveness of the award.178 Similarly, the court in 
EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc. calculated the punitive damages ratio by first using 
only compensatory damages and then by including the award of back 
pay, concluding that the relevant ratio in either event passed constitutional 
muster.179 As one scholar has argued, courts reviewing punitive damages 
awards in employment cases regularly under account for awards of back 
pay, reinstatement, and attorney fees awarded to prevailing plaintiffs, as 
well as the monetary value of injunctive relief.180 This uncertainty and 
lack of consistency among courts assessing the proper numerator in such 
 
 172. Parexel Int’l Corp. v. Feliciano, No. 04-CV-3798, 2008 WL 5101642 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
 173. Id. at *2. 
 174. Id. at *6. 
 175. Id. at *6 n.8. 
 176. See Deters v. USF Ins. Co., 797 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished table decision). 
 177. Id. 
 178. 527 F. Supp. 2d 230, 245 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 179. 707 F.3d 824, 839–40 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 180. See Sandra Sperino, The New Calculus of Punitive Damages for Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 62 Ok. L. Rev. 701, 709–13 (2010). 
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cases would be greatly benefitted by the Supreme Court’s review of punitive 
damages in the employment law context. 
Another problem in computing the proper ratio is that setting the 
precise number to use as the numerator of the ratio fraction is not handled 
uniformly from one jurisdiction to the next. For example, while many 
courts focus exclusively on the compensatory damages award, tort law in 
a number of states allows the inclusion of prejudgment interest as part of 
the ratio numerator,181 and others also include court costs and the attorneys’ 
fees awarded to the plaintiff.182 Five percent of the cases in our study 
counted attorneys’ fees, prejudgment interest, and other types of extra-
compensatory values in calculating the proper numerator. Courts must 
also assess the role of statutory caps on compensatory awards, such as 
limits on the recovery of noneconomic damages. In conducting the ratio 
analysis for reviewing constitutional excessiveness, courts must decide 
whether to compare the punitive damages awarded to the “harm” 
represented by the jury’s original determination of damages or only to the 
amount of compensatory damage allowed under the relevant statutory cap. 
Moreover, in jurisdictions where fault is assigned on a comparative 
basis, courts must decide how to construct the ratio if the compensatory 
damages award must be reduced by the percentage of fault assigned to 
the plaintiff. The consensus solution appears to be to use the entire 
compensatory damages award as the numerator of the ratio fraction, 
even though the plaintiff did not collect the full compensatory award.183  
Finally, correctly constructing the punitive ratio for excessiveness 
review may be complicated in cases involving multiple defendants 
against whom punitive damages awards were made separately. Courts 
must determine whether to compare the total amount of compensatory 
damages awarded to the plaintiff with the total amount of punitive damages, 
or separately analyze the compensatory to punitive damages ratio with 
respect to each defendant. In Cooley v. Lincoln Electric Co., for example, 
the plaintiff was a welder who brought a products liability claim against a 
defendant manufacturer and two individual defendants.184 To complicate 
matters, the compensatory award was reduced by the amount determined 
 
 181. See USA Commercial Mortg. Co. v. Compass USA SPE LLC, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Nev. 2008). 
 182. Compare Deters, 797 N.W.2d 621 (combining estimate of potential harm, an out-of-court 
settlement, and an award of attorney fees to produce the $1 million denominator in the ratio fraction), 
with Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Advertising Display Sys., Nos. A102492, A102716, 2004 WL 2181793, 
at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2004) (reversing a series of punitive damages awards because the jury’s 
compensatory damages awards improperly included plaintiffs’ attorney fee expenses). 
 183. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 90 So. 3d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (using 
the full $10.8 million compensatory damages amount in the ratio to support a $40.8 million punitive damages 
award, even though plaintiff only received fifty-one percent of the award); see also Merrick v. Paul Revere 
Life Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1191 (D. Nev. 2008). 
 184. Cooley v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 776 F. Supp. 2d 511 (N.D. Ohio 2011).  
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to constitute the plaintiff’s comparative fault. To implement the ratio 
guidepost, the court combined the two compensatory damages awards 
against each individual defendant and compared them with the total 
punitive damages awarded to produce an overall ratio of 7:1. If the court 
had treated the two punitive awards separately, the ratios would have 
been 9:1 and 4:1, both still within the single digit norm, but with the 
larger ratio perhaps raising more serious excessiveness questions. While 
the court’s approach is not irrational, it would appear to make more 
sense for a reviewing court to evaluate the punitive damages award in 
relation to the compensatory damages awarded against each individual 
defendant separately. For example, imagine that the ratios of the separate 
awards in the Cooley case had been 15:1 and 3:1. The first award would 
have been much more suspect than a combined award coming in at the 
7:1 ratio. 
A 2012 Minnesota case involving multiple defendants, one of which 
was a corporation, raised similar issues to the Cooley case. In McGrath v. 
MICO, Inc.,185 the plaintiff prevailed on two distinct claims (breach of 
fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract) against the 
corporation and two individual defendants. Although the jury awarded 
separate compensatory damages on each of the two claims, in ruling on 
excessiveness challenges from all three defendants, the court compared 
the punitive damages award against each defendant to the total 
compensatory damages awarded for both claims, and concluded that the 
ratios for the corporation and each of the two individual defendants were 
1:1 or less, and therefore not close to excessive.186 If the compensatory 
awards had been disaggregated, the ratios would have been in the middle 
to high single digits. In passing, the court noted that as to the tortious 
interference with contract claim against the two individual defendants, 
the disaggregated ratios would have been 4:1 and 8:1, both still well within 
the single digit norm. 
Noble Biomaterials v. Argentum Medical, LLC,187 raised the issue of 
what to do when no compensatory damages were awarded against two 
individual defendants who nevertheless had substantial punitive damages 
awards assessed against them. In this patent infringement case, the Ohio 
court awarded substantial compensatory damages only against the 
corporate defendant, but no punitive damages. Punitive damages of $1 
million and $1.2 million respectively, but no compensatory damages, were 
awarded against the two individual defendants.188 Brushing aside the 
defendant’s objection that these punitive damages awards were 
 
 185. Nos. A11–1087, A11–1109, A12–0093, 2012 WL 6097116 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2012).  
 186. Id. at *14. 
 187. No. 3:08-CV-1305, 2011 WL 4458796 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2011). 
 188. Id. at *3. 
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unconstitutionally excessive because no compensatory damages had been 
assessed against the individual defendants, the court observed that each 
of the two individual defendants had actually done roughly $1 million in 
harm to the plaintiff, so the punitive awards were not excessive.189 
 This aggregation of compensatory and punitive damages appears 
to be the majority approach. We found very few multiple defendant cases 
where the punitive to compensatory ratios were disaggregated for each 
defendant.190 We question whether the aggregation approach is consistent 
with the fairness rationale regularly advanced to support constitutional 
review of punitive damages. Fairness would seem to require that punitive 
damages be assessed with respect to each defendant relative to the amount 
of harm or the potential harm inflicted.  
3. Factors Justifying Ratios Above Single Digits 
The Court has offered three justifications for tolerating a high punitive 
damages ratio: (1) a finding of high reprehensibility coupled with low 
economic harm, (2) misconduct that is particularly hard to detect, and (3) 
harm to plaintiff that is difficult to quantify.191 Table 10 details the cases 
in our study that explicitly apply one or more of these ratio-enhancing 
factors. 
Table 10: Utilization of Ratio Enhancing Factors 
Radio Enhancing Factor Number of Cases 
Low Compensatory Damages 107 (21%)
     Compensatory Damages Found “Low”  73 (14%) 
     Compensatory Damages Not Found “Low” 34 (7%) 
Misconduct Hard to Detect 35 (7.0%)
     Misconduct Found to be Hard to Detect 16 (3%) 
     Misconduct Not Found to be Hard to Detect 19 (4%) 
Harm Difficult to Quantify 38 (7.5%)
    Harm Found Difficult to Quantify 26 (5%) 
    Harm Found Not Difficult to Quantify 12 (2%) 
Even at only fourteen percent of the cases in our study, by far the 
most commonly invoked justification for double or triple digit punitive 
damages ratios is a finding of very low or nominal compensatory awards 
 
 189. Id. at *8. 
 190. See, e.g., Wackenhut Corr. Corp. v. de la Rosa, 305 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App. 2009); Redmond v. 
Goosherst, No. 06 C 3611, 2008 WL 3823099 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2008); cf. Gibbons v. Bair Found., Inc., 
No. 1:04CV2018, 2007 WL 582314 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2007) (declining to reduce award due to statutory 
cap on punitive damages where award imposed against each of the defendants separately fell below the 
applicable cap, although exceeded the cap in aggregate).  
 191. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996).  
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coupled with a high degree of reprehensibility.192 Where justified by the 
particular facts of the case, such high ratios are regularly found not to 
violate due process if necessary to accomplish the state’s interest in 
retribution and deterrence. In cases involving nominal or small 
compensatory damages awards but high punitive damages, some lower 
court opinions quote extensively from Gore and Campbell on the topic of 
ratios, and then, based on the language quoted and virtually no further 
analysis of the facts, conclusively hold that the ratio in the specific case 
before them is, or is not, constitutionally permissible.193  
Although some scholars have asserted that the most economically 
efficient approach to punitive damages requires assessment of the 
likelihood of detection rather than proportionality to compensatory 
damages generally,194 only three percent of the courts in our sample cited 
that factor in their ratio analysis. Our sample reflected a similarly low 
incidence (five percent) of courts citing the difficulty of quantifying the 
plaintiff’s harm as the justification for high punitive to compensatory ratios. 
4. “Substantial” Compensatory Damages and the 1:1 Ratio 
Dicta in the Campbell opinion,195 reinforced by Justice Souter’s opinion 
and comments in Exxon Shipping,196 have created notable uncertainty 
among lower courts about how to handle contested punitive damages 
awards when the plaintiff recovers what is arguably a very large 
compensatory damages award. The suggestion in both cases is that 
recovery of “substantial” compensatory damages should drive down the 
constitutionally permissible punitive damages award, perhaps to a 1:1 
ratio or less. In Exxon Shipping, Justice Souter explained in a footnote 
that “[t]he criterion of ‘substantial’ takes into account the role of punitive 
 
 192. See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. Wilkins, 22 A.3d 774 (D.C. 2011) (affirming nearly $43,000 in punitive 
damages in defamation and retaliatory termination case where plaintiff was awarded only $1 in nominal 
damages).  
 193. See, e.g., Cooley v. Lincoln Elec., 776 F. Supp. 2d 511 (N.D. Ohio 2011).  
 194. See, e.g., Rhee, supra note 10, at 52 (suggesting proper punitive damages formula as plaintiff’s harm 
multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of being found liable); Calandrillo, supra note 86, at 805 
(“[P]rincipled jurists understand that punitive damages should be awarded only where tortfeasors have 
the potential to escape liability for their actions.”); Hubbard, supra note 4, at 372 (“Partly because it has 
rejected any substantial role for deterrence as a purpose of punitive damages, the Court has not been 
receptive to a number of factors that would indicate the need for a higher ratio to improve deterrence. 
More specifically, the Court has been reluctant to recognize the relevance of the difficulty of detection 
and likelihood of being sanctioned, the costs of litigation, the possibility of financial gain, the potential 
harm to third parties, or the defendant’s wealth.”).  
 195. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“When compensatory 
damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the 
outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”). 
 196. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 503 n.28 (2008) (“In this case, then, the 
constitutional outer limit may well be 1:1.”). 
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damages to induce legal action when pure compensation may not be 
enough to encourage suit.”197 
Since 2008, when Exxon Shipping was decided, a few lower court 
cases have questioned whether the Court’s decision under its exclusive 
authority over maritime law should be read to mandate 1:1 or lower ratios 
under the due process analysis whenever the amount of compensatory 
damages awarded plaintiff was relatively large. In Jurinko v. Medical 
Protective Co., for example, the Third Circuit appeared on a casual 
reading to apply the Court’s admiralty rubric to the due process ratio 
analysis.198 In this bad-faith insurance case, a federal jury applying 
Pennsylvania law had found for the plaintiff, awarding compensatory 
damages of $1,658,345 and $6,250,000 in punitive damages.199 Writing for 
the majority, Chief Judge Scirica found the punitive damages awarded to 
be excessive and reduced them to achieve a 1:1 ratio.200 Chief Judge 
Scirica reasoned that the result followed the Court’s “trend” toward lower 
ratios in cases involving no physical injury and where the defendant’s 
conduct was not highly reprehensible. Although the opinion cited Exxon 
Shipping in reference to this supposed trend, the opinion went on to 
make clear that the decision to reduce the punitive damages award as 
excessive was based strictly on application of the three guideposts set out 
in Gore and Campbell. Citing what it referred to as “instructions” from 
the Campbell case, the opinion explained that the defendant’s conduct 
“does not justify so high an award in light of the moderate degree of 
reprehensibility, the substantial compensatory award, and the large 
disparity between the award and civil penalties under [Pennsylvania law].”201 
No lower court to date has ruled that Exxon Shipping applies directly 
to the due process analysis under the ratio guidepost.202 A few cases have 
cited Exxon Shipping in passing, but declined to apply its 1:1 rationale to 
the facts of the case before the court.203 The great majority of cases have 
explicitly rejected the argument that Exxon Shipping changed the standards 
under which reviewing courts were to apply the ratio guidepost ratio 
 
 197. Id. at 515 n.28. 
 198. Jurinko v. Med. Protective Co., 305 F. App’x 13, 25 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
 199. Id. at 15. 
 200. Id. at 30. 
 201. Id.  
 202. In Justice W. Jones’ dissent in Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 
233 P.3d 1221, 1284 (Idaho 2010), he expressly favored treating Exxon’s 1:1 ratio limit as a constitutional 
requirement where the total compensatory damages exceeded $400,000. The majority in the Weinstein case, 
however, upheld a punitive damage award of $1,890,000 as constitutionally permissible, rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that Exxon required no greater that a 1:1 ratio. Id. at 1262 (majority opinion). 
 203. See, e.g., Amerigraphics v. Mercury Cas. Co., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing 
Exxon, but not applying its 1:1 ratio analysis). 
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analysis. In Line v. Ventura,204 the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the 
defendant’s claim that Exxon Shipping had established a new constitutional 
limit for ratios of 1:1 or less. The Alabama court noted that the Exxon 
Shipping decision explicitly limited its holding to federal maritime law, 
and emphasized that “[t]he appropriate standard for considering the 
excessiveness of the punitive-damages award is set out in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell and BMW of North 
America v. Gore.”205 Similarly, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Dodson,206 the 
Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s remittitur and restored 
the jury’s award of $15 million in punitive damages, which represented a 
2.5:1 ratio with the compensatory damages. The high court criticized the 
trial court for being “influenced in its grant of the remittitur by the case 
of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, where the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages was one to one. The Exxon case is not apposite 
in our judgment.”207 
Eighty-five cases (or seventeen percent of our total) expressly found 
the compensatory damages at issue to be substantial. Those cases, however, 
show a wide variation on the question of what amount of compensatory 
damages rises to the level of a “substantial” award warranting possible 
reduction in punitive damages to achieve a 1:1 ratio.  
While Campbell characterized a $1,000,000 compensatory award as 
“substantial,” courts in our study found damages far less than that to 
warrant a ratio reduction. Courts in about half of the cases in our study 
described as “substantial” compensatory damages ranging from $100,000 
to $1,000,000. In Mendez-Matos v. Guaynab, for example, the First Circuit 
found that a $35,000 compensatory award to a plaintiff for unlawful 
detention on a construction site was too “substantial” to justify the jury’s 
award of $350,000 in punitive damages.208 The First Circuit mandated a 
reduction of the punitive award to $35,000, ensuring a 1:1 ratio.209 Of the 
181 cases in our study affirming compensatory damages in the $100,000 
to $1,000,000 range, however, 142 (seventy-eight percent) did not 
characterize the compensatory damages as “substantial.” Figure 1 shows 
the relevant post-review ratios of punitive to compensatory damages in 
cases affirming compensatory damages between $100,000 and $1,000,000.  
  
 
 204. 38 So. 3d 1, 13 (Ala. 2009). 
 205. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 206. 2011 Ark. 19, at 31–32, 376 S.W.3d 414, 434. 
 207. Id. at 32 (internal citation omitted).  
 208. Mendez-Matos v. Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009).  
 209. Id. at 54–56; see also Allam v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 2d 274, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding $200,000 
compensatory award “substantial” and accordingly reducing $300,000 punitive damages to $200,000 to 
achieve a 1:1 ratio).  
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Figure 1: Punitive to Compensatory Ratios by  
Compensatory Damages $100,000–$999,000 
 
Although only twenty-one percent of the cases explicitly described the 
compensatory damages at issue to be “substantial,” thirty-eight percent of 
the cases in this range fell at or below a 1.9:1 ratio. Another thirty-seven 
percent of the cases resulted in ratios from 2:1–4.9:1, the benchmark ratios 
described by the Court as nearing the constitutional limit in Haslip.210 In 
twenty-four percent of the cases in this compensatory range, the final 
punitive damages ratio exceeded 5:1, with five percent exceeding a 10:1 
ratio.  
 Courts affirmed compensatory damages in excess of $1,000,000 in 
thirty-four of the eighty-five cases in our study that explicitly invoked 
Campbell’s ratio-reducing “substantial” rationale. These thirty-four cases 
represent only thirty percent of the courts in our study affirming million or 
multi-million dollar compensatory awards. Figure 2 sets forth the punitive 
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Figure 2: Punitive to Compensatory Ratios by  
Compensatory Damages over $1,000,000 
 
As seen in Figure 2, forty-eight percent of cases involving million or 
multi-million dollar compensatory damages awards resulted in punitive 
to compensatory ratios of 1:1 or less. So even in the absence of an 
express invocation of the “substantial” compensatory damages rationale 
for lowering punitive damages, courts considering high value claims more 
often affirmed punitive ratios of 1:1 or lower. Another way to view this 
data, however, is that over fifty-two percent of cases affirming million or 
multimillion dollar compensatory awards nonetheless exceeded a 1:1 ratio.  
In Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,211 for example, the California 
Court of Appeal upheld a $13.8 million punitive damages award where 
the compensatory damages award was $850,000. Over the dissent’s 
argument that a 1:1 ratio was justified, the majority ruled that not only 
was the $850,000 compensatory award not “substantial,” it was so relatively 
“small” that it justified a 16:1 ratio for punitive damages because of the 
extremely reprehensible degree of defendant’s misconduct.212 Similarly, 
the court in Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.213 ruled that a compensatory 
award of $2.5 million was not “substantial” in upholding a punitive damages 
award of over $13 million, a ratio of roughly 5:1. The Tennessee court 
explained that it did not believe a punitive damages award based on a 1:1 
ratio would adequately punish or deter defendant’s reckless conduct.214 
 
 211. 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 406 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 212. Id. at 406. 
 213. 272 S.W.3d 521, 544–45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
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If the Supreme Court intends 1:1 to represent a significant restraint on 
punitive damages in cases involving “substantial” compensatory damages, 
that message is not being well received by lower courts, most of whom do 
not expressly consider the “substantial” rationale at all. Even among 
lower courts who do characterize compensatory awards as “substantial,” 
moreover, the majority do not appear to feel particularly bound by a 1:1 
ratio. The Nevada district court in Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Insurance 
Co., for example, deemed plaintiff’s $2.9 million compensatory damage 
award to be “substantial,” but nonetheless lowered the $36 million 
punitive damages award only to $27 million, thereby ensuring a 9:1 single 
digit ratio rather than a 1:1 ratio.215 Similarly, the Montana Supreme 
Court in Seltzer v. Morton found the $1.1 million compensatory award at 
issue to be “substantial” under Campbell, but felt compelled only to reduce 
the punitive ratio from 18:1 to 9:1.216 
These cases demonstrate the dominant power of the single digit 
ratio even in cases where courts have explicitly recognized the rationale 
in favor of reducing punitive awards in cases with substantial compensatory 
damages. Determining when compensatory awards are sufficiently 
substantial to limit the punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio obviously depends 
heavily on how the reviewing court interprets the amount of the 
compensatory damages in relation to the facts of the case, particularly 
the degree of reprehensibility involved, and arguably interjects a disturbing 
degree of subjectivity into the review process. This is clearly an area 
where further clarification from the Supreme Court would be beneficial. 
5. Dynamic Relationship Between the Reprehensibility and Ratio 
Guideposts 
The degree of reprehensibility can exert a strong influence on 
establishing the appropriate ratio between punitive damages and 
compensatory damages. It is by far the most common factor lower courts 
rely on to evaluate the reasonableness of the disparity between a punitive 
damage award and the compensatory recovery the plaintiff has received. 
Almost half of the cases in our study, 236, considered the degree of 
reprehensibility in analyzing the constitutionality of a punitive damages 
ratio. In thirty percent of our cases, the court concluded that a particular 
ratio was justified due to the “highly reprehensible” nature of the 
defendant’s conduct, while seventeen percent of the cases made express 
findings that the conduct at issue was not particularly reprehensible. A 
few courts even start their excessiveness analysis with the ratio, and then 
turn back to weighing the degree of reprehensibility to determine whether it 
 
 215. 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Nev. 2008).  
 216. 2007 MT 62, ¶ 189, 336 Mont. 225, 154 P.3d 561.  
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should be adjusted down or up. After the court initially determines the 
existing ratio between the punitive damages and the compensatory 
damages, it must then determine whether the application of due process 
standards support affirmation of the punitive award or require the court 
to adjust it downward (or upward if the trial court remitted the jury’s 
award of punitive damages).  
If there is room for doubt about whether a particular punitive damages 
award is unconstitutionally excessive, the degree of reprehensibility can 
become the determinative factor in setting the upward limit of the allowable 
multiplier between punitive damages and compensatory damages. Today, 
courts routinely rank the degree of the defendant’s reprehensibility on a 
wide spectrum that runs from very little reprehensibility,217 through modest 
or intermediate reprehensibility,218 and up to substantial or extreme 
reprehensibility.219 Using the relative degree of reprehensibility as a tool 
to pin down the appropriate relationship between compensatory and 
punitive damages makes perfect sense, and this secondary use of 
reprehensibility is readily demonstrated in the relevant Supreme Court 
opinions. Therefore, it is not surprising that in implementing the ratio 
guidepost, lower courts routinely review contested ratios against the 
degree of reprehensibility already examined under the reprehensibility 
guidepost.220  
Numerous cases in our study demonstrate this common secondary 
use of the degree of reprehensibility to ascertain the correct ratio. For 
 
 217. See, e.g., Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 308–10 (Tex. 2007) (finding 
only one reprehensibility factor was clearly insufficient to support punitive award seventeen times 
compensatory damages); Jim Ray, Inc. v. Williams, 260 S.W.3d 307 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that 
defendant’s conduct was at the lower end of the range of reprehensible behavior, so an award ten times 
compensatory damages was reduced to a 7:1 ratio).  
 218. See, e.g., Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 436 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006) (medium level reprehensibility did 
not support a punitive award over a 2:1 ratio with the compensatory award); Stogsdill v. Healthmark 
Partners, LLC, 377 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding defendant’s conduct was neglectful, but at most 
only substantially reprehensible, so no greater than a 4:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages was justified); Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Store, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 105 (Ct. App. 2006) (sexual 
harassment of six plaintiffs showed only a “modest degree of reprehensibility,” justifying a 6:1 ratio).  
 219. See, e.g., Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding 
defendant’s conduct was “exceedingly reprehensible,” and the “enormity of his offense” justified $17.5 
million punitive damages award, even though the compensatory damages award was substantial); Romanski 
v. Detroit Entm’t, LLC, 428 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding inexplicable and egregious harm to casino 
patron, which produced only minimal compensatory damages, justified punitive damages award 2000 times 
the compensatory award); Aon Risk Servs. v. Mickles, 242 S.W.3d 286 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (finding 
defendant’s outrageous deceit was highly reprehensible and justified imposition of punitive award twenty-
five times compensatory damages).  
 220. See Payne v. Jones, 696 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding 1:5 ratio excessive because the degree 
of reprehensibility was too low to justify that level of punitive damages). Similarly, in Allam v. Meyers, 
906 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), the court found a 1.5:1 ratio excessive, saying the degree of 
reprehensibility was not high because a brutal assault did not cause lasting physical or emotional injury 
to the plaintiff.  
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example, in a recent Nevada case, the defendant repeatedly ignored the 
plaintiff’s warnings that roots from trees on the defendant’s land were 
progressively undermining and destroying a boundary wall on plaintiff’s 
land, and damaging the plumbing in plaintiff’s swimming pool.221 In 
upholding a punitive damages award of $100,000 against the defendant, 
where plaintiff recovered only $28,000 in compensatory damages when 
the damaged wall collapsed, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that the 
award was permissible, even though the ratio exceeded the provisional 
state law limit of 3:1.222 In justifying a higher ratio, the court adverted 
specifically to defendant’s continuous misconduct (failing to remove the 
offending trees), which exposed the plaintiff and his family to a safety 
hazard, as sufficiently reprehensible to make the punitive award “not 
grossly excessive.”223  
 Moving further toward the other end of the ratio scale, a federal 
bankruptcy court in Louisiana upheld a punitive damages award of over 
$3 million against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. for failing to honor 
a stay order issued by the court.224 In discussing whether the over 10:1 
ratio of the award was excessive, the court observed that the Wells Fargo’s 
actions “were not only highly reprehensible, but its subsequent reaction 
on their exposure has been less than satisfactory.”225 In the last line of its 
opinion the court underlined the deterrent purpose of the award, saying: 
“This Court hopes that the relief granted will finally motivate Wells 
Fargo to rectify its practices and comply with the terms of court orders, 
plans and the automatic stay.”226 
6. Consideration of Defendant’s Wealth 
The Court has provided only the sketchiest of guidance as to the 
extent to which a defendant’s wealth may properly be factored into the 
due process excessiveness analysis. As far back as TXO, the Court approved 
a state’s punitive damages procedures that permitted consideration of 
defendant’s wealth for the purpose of determining the size of a punitive 
damages award.227 Indeed, the tort laws of most states similarly authorize 
 
 221. Prestige of Beverly Hills, Inc. v. Weber, No. 55837, 2012 WL 991696, *6 (Nev. Mar. 21, 2012).  
 222. Id. at *7. 
 223. Id. 
 224. In re Jones, No. 03-16518, 2012 WL 1155715 (Bankr. E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2012).  
 225. Id. at *10.  
 226. Id.  
 227. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); see also Cooper Indus., Inc. 
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001) (noting jury directive to consider the “defendant’s 
income and assets”). But see TXO, 509 U.S. at 473 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that strong 
economic policy arguments suggest “permitting juries to consider a defendant’s wealth is unwise, if not 
irrational”).  
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the plaintiff to introduce such wealth evidence.228 The theory behind 
allowing evidence of defendant’s relative wealth is fairly straightforward—if 
the purpose of punitive damages is to advance the state’s interest in 
punishing egregious wrongdoers and to deter repeated wrongdoing, 
wealthy defendants committing highly outrageous wrongs will neither be 
punished appropriately nor sufficiently deterred by a punitive damages 
award that is small relative to the defendant’s wealth.229 If a punitive 
damages award is to serve its social purpose, therefore, in “stinging” the 
defendant in retribution for a particularly egregious harm or providing a 
meaningful deterrent to future misconduct by the defendant or others 
similarly situated,230 it must be large enough to affect the defendant’s 
financial situation significantly.231  
Despite the Supreme Court’s affirmations of the relevance of the 
defendant’s wealth in the assessment of punitive damages, however, its 
dicta on wealth in Campbell has created significant uncertainty among 
lower courts on the role of such evidence. In his criticism of the Utah 
Supreme Court’s reference to State Farm’s wealth, Justice Kennedy 
asserted that the “wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise 
unconstitutional punitive damages award.”232 In other words, the mere 
fact that a defendant is wealthy is not, standing alone, a proper ground for 
awarding punitive damages,233 but wealth remains a relevant consideration. 
The defendant’s wealth was cited in fifty-two cases in our study, 
although a number of courts expressed confusion about exactly what role 
wealth is supposed play in the excessiveness review. As one district court 
put it, the Court in Campbell “rendered uncertain” the constitutional 
soundness of considering defendant’s financial condition as a justification 
for punitive damages.234 Moreover, this language has proven quite 
frustrating to lower courts and scholars to the extent that it reflects the 
 
 228. See Morton F. Daller, Tort Law Desk Reference: A Fifty-State Compendium ¶ Q (2002).  
 229. See Dobbs, Hayden & Bublick, Torts and Compensation 602 (6th ed. 2009).  
 230. A few jurisdictions allow only specific deterrence of the defendants as the justification for punitive 
damages, as opposed to general deterrence of similarly situated potential wrongdoers. See Hollis v. 
Stonington Dev., Inc., 714 S.E.2d 904 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011).  
 231. See Epstein & Sharkey, Cases and Materials on Torts 886–88 (10th ed. 2012); see also Tarr 
v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 943 A.2d 866 (N.J. 2008); Parexel Int’l Corp. v. Feliciano, No. 
04-CV-3798, 2008 WL 5101642 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008) (affirming a large punitive damages award by 
noting that defendant was a “prosperous multi-million dollar corporation” and a smaller punitive damages 
award “may be wholly insufficient to influence their behavior”); Guidance Endodontics, LLC v. Dentsply 
Int’l, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1016 (D.N.M. 2011) (holding that defendant’s wealth may be considered 
in deciding whether to order a remitter of nearly $36 million).  
 232. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003).  
 233. Id. 
 234. Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 74 (Ct. App. 2004); see also McClain v. Metabolife 
Int’l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1229 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (acknowledging that post-Campbell, “this court 
is not sure whether financial impact on a defendant is a thing to be considered”).  
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Court’s reluctance to adopt defendant’s relative wealth as a suitable 
rubric for determining the amount of punitive damages necessary to 
achieve optimal deterrence.235 
California courts, in particular, have championed the use of wealth 
information as an important factor in calculating an award of punitive 
damages. Indeed, wealth of the defendant seems to be treated as a de 
facto fourth guidepost in California for reviewing a challenged punitive 
damages award for excessiveness.236 In Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, for 
example, the court explained that “‘[b]ecause the purposes of punitive 
damages are to punish the wrongdoer and to make an example of him, 
the wealthier the wrongdoer, the larger the award of punitive damages.’”237 
In Alcoser v. Thomas, the California Court of Appeal responded to the 
defendant’s argument that an award greater than a 1:1 ratio was 
unconstitutionally excessive by pointing out that punitive damages are 
intended primarily to punish and deter.238 Therefore, the court reasoned, 
“[l]imiting an award to an arbitrary ratio of no more than the actual 
damage would do serve neither function.”239 Instead, “such a proposal 
‘would flatten out the variability of punitive damage awards by 
deemphasizing two important factors used to determine such damages: 
the extent of the defendant's misconduct and its wealth.’”240 Based on a 
showing that defendant’s wealth was between $25 million and $35 million, 
the court sustained a $1 million punitive damages award where the 
compensatory damages awarded were $130,000.241 
 Apparently undaunted by the language in Campbell, courts in 
California have continued to utilize wealth evidence in their review of 
punitive damages. As one court explained, “State Farm did not disavow 
the use of wealth in assessing punitive damages. The principle of federalism 
remains in play . . . . And State Farm recognizes that deterrence is one of 
 
 235. See Spencer, supra note 86, at 1102 (bemoaning the “strict proportionality principle announced 
by the Court, [which] does not account for the need to tailor punitive damages to the financial condition 
of the defendant (and prospective wrongdoers) to achieve the desired level of punishment and deterrence”); 
Hubbard, supra note 4, at 382 (criticizing the Court for “deemphasize[ing] the relevance of wealth of a 
defendant to the amount of punitive damages award necessary to deter that defendant (and defendants of 
similar wealth) from future misconduct”); id. (“From an economic perspective, wealth is relevant to 
deterrence by monetary sanctions.”); Rustad, supra note 97, at 492 (“Corporate defendants have won 
a large victory in the Court’s marginalization of the role of wealth in the punitive damages equation.”). 
 236. See, e.g., Liu v. Wong, No. A128668, 2011 WL 6100443, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2011); 
Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 676 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing wealth of defendant as 
one of three historic factors in California’s excessiveness analysis).  
 237. Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 849, 856 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Downey 
Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 234 Cal. Rptr. 835, 851 (Ct. App. 1987)).  
 238. Alcoser v. Thomas, Nos. A124848, A125994, A126464, 2011 WL 537855, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Feb. 16, 2011). 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. (quoting Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 993 P.2d 388, 396 (Cal. 2000)). 
 241. Id.  
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the primary purposes of punitive damages.”242 Courts in other jurisdictions 
have similarly persisted in including the defendant’s financial size in their 
evaluation of constitutional excessiveness.243 
Every now and then, the wealth issue before the court is focused not 
on how large the defendant’s wealth is, but rather whether, because of 
very limited wealth, the defendant can possibly afford to pay the large 
punitive damages award levied against him. Under South Carolina law, 
for example, a defendant’s ability to pay is treated as an essential element 
in determining the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.244 It is 
not unusual for a court to observe that punitive damages are intended to 
punish and deter, but not to cause the financial ruination of the defendant. 
As an older Florida opinion stated: An award of punitive damages should 
“exact[] from [the defendant’s] pocketbook a sum of money which, 
according to the financial ability, will hurt, but not bankrupt” the 
defendant.245  
In a recent case, the California Court of Appeal confronted a claim 
by the defendant that he totally lacked the financial ability to pay the 
sizeable punitive damages award assessed against him. In Peterson v. 
Stewart, the defendant was found liable for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress against three plaintiffs, each of whom was awarded 
$150,000 compensatory damages and $40,000 punitive damages.246 Citing 
well-established California authority, the court first noted that, although 
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter, those purposes 
cannot be served by financially destroying the defendant.247 The defendant 
argued that he could not afford to pay the damages assessed against him. 
After reviewing all the evidence concerning defendant’s wealth, however, 
the court concluded the awards were justified and would not destroy 
defendant financially.248  
 
 242. Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 682 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 243. See, e.g., Jones v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 489 B.R. 645, 655 (E.D. La. 2013) (citing Fifth 
Circuit precedent holding that “the size of a corporation is a factor that is indicative of the reasonableness of 
a damages award”); Arizona v. ASARCO, LLC, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1040 (D. Ariz. 2011) (explaining 
“that sometimes a ‘bigger award is needed to attract the . . . attention of a large corporation’ in order to 
promote deterrence effectively” (quoting Johansen v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1338 (11th 
Cir. 1999))); Guidance Endodontics LLC v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (D.N.M. 2011); 
Dixon-Rollins v. Experian Info. Solution, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d 452, 467 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (remitting punitive 
award against billion dollar company to 9:1 ratio in part due to the importance of “consider[ing] the size 
and wealth of Trans Union in fashioning a proper punitive award”).  
 244. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Fortis Ins. Co., 686 S.E.2d 176, 184–85 (S.C. 2009).  
 245. Lehman v. Spencer Ladd’s Inc, 182 So. 2d 402, 404 (Fla. 1965). 
 246. Peterson v. Stewart, No. A127682, 2012 WL 541521, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2012). 
 247. Id. at *12. 
 248. Interestingly, contrary to the prevailing burden-of-proof convention, the California court ruled 
that, if the issue of the defendant’s ability to pay is raised, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the 
defendant has the ability to pay the punitive damages award without suffering financial ruination. Id.  
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Most courts agree that the party who wishes to argue points based 
on the defendant’s inability to pay has the burden of bringing forward 
the relevant evidence. In a recent South Carolina case, the defendant 
company claimed it lacked the ability to pay the punitive damages. The 
court responded that there was no record in the trial court about the 
ampleness of the defendant’s financial resources, and the deterrent effect 
intended by the jury justified the size of the award.249 In Bankhead v. 
ArvinMeritor, Inc.,250 a California Court of Appeal faced a case where the 
defendant argued the punitive damages award exceeded the defendant’s 
net worth. In sustaining the award, however, the court held that it was 
uncontroverted that the defendant was financially sound, and that the 
$4.5 million punitive award, though large, was not disproportionate to the 
company’s ability to pay it. The court observed that net worth data was 
too easily manipulated and, without more refined financial disclosures, 
defendant’s ability to pay should not be used to set an outside limit on 
the punitive damages award.251  
Another wealth-related question that occasionally arises is what 
effect paying the punitive damages award at issue will have on the 
defendant’s ability to pay subsequent judgments in favor of other plaintiffs 
with similar claims. The concern is that if a defendant pays a very large 
punitive damages award to the instant plaintiff, it may strip the defendant 
of the ability to pay subsequent awards to future plaintiffs with equally 
meritorious claims. Occasionally, a state statute may address this issue 
directly. For example, a Florida statute in most circumstances prohibits 
multiple punitive damages awards against a defendant for the same 
tortious act or course of conduct.252 In one recent case, however, where 
the defendant raised the threat of multiple suits over the same wrongful 
conduct, the Florida court acknowledged that this might present a 
problem for future plaintiffs, but treated the matter as too speculative to 
justify lowering an award that was otherwise within the bounds of due 
process limitations.253 In another recent case, a Louisiana bankruptcy 
court justified a very large punitive damages award against Wells Fargo 
Home Mortgage by observing that the defendant was not only the 
second largest mortgage lender in the United States, but that a number 
of earlier punitive damages awards against the defendant for the same 
misconduct had obviously not been large enough to deter the defendant’s 
illegal behavior.254  
 
 249. See Magnolia N. Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Heritage Cmtys., 725 S.E.2d 112 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012).  
 250. See Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 849 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 251. Id. at 860. 
 252. See Fla. Stat. § 768.73(2) (2015).  
 253. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 90 So. 3d 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 254. In re Jones, No. 03-16518, 2012 WL 1155715, at *10 (Bankr. E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2012). 
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C. Comparability Guidepost 
As Justice Ginsburg observed in her dissent in Cooper,255 the 
reprehensibility and ratio guideposts are deeply rooted in longstanding 
common law standards, but the comparability guidepost was an original 
creation of Justice Stevens in Gore. Perhaps because it finds no counterpart 
in state law, implementation of the third guidepost has perplexed many 
lower courts and created such difficult implementation problems that the 
importance of the guidepost has noticeably receded over time.256 Indeed, 
in 213 or forty-two percent of the cases in our sample, courts failed to 
expressly engage in any comparability analysis at all. This is perhaps not 
surprising when one considers that guideposts one and two were quite 
similar to the review criteria traditionally employed by state courts to review 
punitive damages awards, but the comparability guidepost was somewhat 
novel and lower courts did not enjoy the same comfort level with it as 
they did with the other two guideposts. 
This different reception by lower courts is understandable when it is 
remembered that the comparability guidepost represented the Court’s 
most direct effort to give substantive content to the “fair notice” concerns 
that underlay its new due process approach to the review of punitive 
damages. As Justice O’Connor explained in the Haslip case, “the point 
of due process—of the law in general—is to allow citizens to order their 
behavior.”257 Thus, the purpose of the comparability guidepost is to 
insure that potential wrongdoers are provided reasonable insight by the 
legal system into the possible financial consequences of a serious misdeed, 
so that they can structure their conduct to avoid harshly adverse results. 
Because lower courts had no prior experience in comparing punitive 
damages awards to civil sanctions or criminal penalties for similar 
misbehavior, Justice Scalia’s prediction of the guideposts’ failure to 
achieve the Court’s objectives was much more likely to come to pass with 
respect to the comparability guidepost. It would be an overly generous 
assessment to conclude that those who predicted failure for the guideposts 
were prescient at least as to the problems posed by the comparability 
guidepost, but the problems lower courts have had with it are sufficiently 
difficult that the third guidepost has diminished greatly in importance 
since it was first announced in Gore. Only occasionally does a lower court 
give special attention to the comparability guidepost and find it to be the 
 
 255. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 447–48 (2001). 
 256. See, e.g., Brim v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1264–65 (N.D. Ala. 2011) 
(denying defendant’s claim for remittitur based on the lack of comparability of the punitive award to 
applicable civil penalties, and citing cases from sister circuits stating that the third guidepost is not 
particularly helpful in federal Fair Credit Reporting Act cases). 
 257. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1990). 
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controlling factor in sustaining or lowering a punitive damages award.258 
Moreover, when review under the comparability guidepost produces a 
result that is inconsistent with the other two guideposts, there is a strong 
tendency to discount the comparability guidepost and to base the decision 
solely on the other two guideposts.259 As some courts suggest, satisfying two 
out of three guideposts should be constitutionally sufficient to sustain or 
correct a punitive damages award with respect to its excessiveness.260 
Courts have identified three major categories of comparable sanctions 
in applying the third guidepost: statutory or regulatory penalties, criminal 
penalties, and punitive damages awarded in comparable civil cases.261 Table 
11 presents the number of cases expressly applying each of those three 
types of comparable penalties. 




Statutory or Regulatory Penalty Considered 223 (44%) 
    Comparable Statutory or Regulatory Penalty Found 162 (32%) 
    No Comparable Statutory or Regulatory Penalty Found 61 (12%) 
Comparison to Punitive Damages Allowed in Other Cases 89 (18%) 
    Comparable Punitive Damages Cases Found 73 (14%) 
    No Relevant Comparable Punitive Damages Cases  16 (3%) 
Criminal Sanction 59 (12%) 
    Criminal Sanctions Considered 34 (7%) 
    Rejection of Criminal Sanction Consideration 25 (5%) 
Not surprisingly, relevant statutory or regulatory penalties were the 
most commonly considered comparisons in our sample. Two hundred and 
twenty-three (or forty-four percent) of our cases show courts attempting to 
analyze such comparable sanctions, although only 162 (or thirty-two 
percent) of the cases successfully identified a relevant statutory provision. 
In sixty-one (or twelve percent) of the cases, courts willing to conduct a 
comparability review nonetheless failed to find any relevant civil penalty 
 
 258. See, e.g., Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 775–77 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 259. See, e.g., Alcoser v. Thomas, Nos. A124848, A125994, A126464, 2011 WL 537855, at *13 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2011) (“While a comparable civil penalty is a factor to be considered, it is not 
determinative in and of itself. It is simply one factor to be considered with all the others . . . .”). 
 260. See Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 539–40 (Tenn. 2008) (after admitting its 
uncertainty about how to balance guideposts that point in different directions, commented that it was 
“inclined to give the first two guideposts considerably more weight”). 
 261. Courts less commonly have upheld a punitive damages award by reference to the comparative 
value of other losses, such as the loss of a license to do business that might have been imposed as a result of 
defendant’s misconduct. See, e.g., Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 238 (3rd Cir. 
2005); Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court 
mentioned these possibilities in Campbell. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 
428 (2003). 
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for the particular wrong at issue262 or disregarded proposed civil penalties 
as too pernicious to use as a comparative sanction.263 In some cases, 
however, a relatively large civil penalty or repeated instances of misconduct 
allowed a compounding of civil sanctions to create large financial penalties 
against which to compare a significant punitive damages award.264 The 
comparability guidepost is often employed when a state or Congress has 
adopted a statutory cap on punitive damages or set a maximum ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages.265 Even when review with 
respect the comparability guidepost arguably produces a conclusive result 
based on a specific civil fine or other penalty, a court not satisfied with the 
limit it imposes can hypothesize that a relatively small civil fine might be 
imposed a great many times to elevate the civil penalty to a level where it 
is comparable to the punitive damages award.266 
In the second smaller but growing category of comparative punitive 
metrics, applied in fourteen percent of the cases in our study, courts 
compared punitive damages with those imposed in similar cases within or 
outside the jurisdiction.267 In Qwest Services Corp. v. Blood,268 for example, 
the Colorado Supreme Court found that the defendant was on notice to 
the possible financial consequences of its misconduct in light of both the 
Colorado punitive damages statute and numerous similar Colorado cases 
upholding large exemplary damages awards. A similar result was reached 
in a Texas wrongful death case, Wackenhut Corrections Corp. v. de la 
Rosa.269 There, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s 
 
 262. See, e.g., Arnold v. Wilder, No. 3:04CV-649-6, 2009 WL 2835783, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 
2009) (“The parties agree that the third guidepost is not in play. There are no civil penalties with which to 
make a comparison.”); Brown v. Comm’r of Prob., 28 Mass. L. Rptr. 549 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2011) (observing 
that neither the parties nor the court could find any civil or criminal penalties); Saunders v. Branch 
Banking and Trust Co. of Va., 526 F.3d. 142, 152–53 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the third guidepost 
was inapplicable in suits under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, where Congress had not chosen to place 
any statutory limits on punitive damages). 
 263. See, e.g., Duncan v. Ford Motor Co., 682 S.E.2d 877, 891–921 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009); Cook v. 
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1211–13 (Dist. Colo. 2008) (electing not to engage in a 
comparability analysis because the penalty to be imposed under various environmental laws would prove 
too difficult to determine). 
 264. See, e.g., Willow Inn, 399 F.3d at 238 (admitting to being “unsure as to how to properly apply this 
guidepost,” but noting that defendant’s misconduct could have amounted to multiple and escalating 
violations of the relevant insurance practices act). 
 265. See EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2013). See generally Tracy A. Thomas, 
Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 Hastings L.J. 73 (2007); Colleen 
P. Murphy, Statutory Caps and Judicial Review of Damages, 39 Akron L. Rev. 1001 (2006). 
 266. See Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont’l Carbon, Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2007). At 
least one court rejected this projection of the possibility of multiple violations as too speculative. See Stogsdill 
v. Healthmark Partners, LLC, 377 F. 3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 267. See, e.g., Cody P. v. Bank of America, 720 S.E.2d 473, 484–85 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011); Morris v. 
Flaig, 511 F. Supp. 2d 282, 310–13 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 268. 252 P.3d 1071, 1100 (Colo. 2011). 
 269. 305 S.W.3d 594, 660 (Tex. App. 2009). 
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argument that it had no notice of the possibility that a punitive damages 
award against it for “malicious and grossly negligent” misconduct could 
possibly exceed four times the compensatory damages awarded to the 
plaintiff. The Texas court affirmed the jury’s punitive damages award of 
$47.5 million, citing several earlier Texas cases affirming multi-million 
dollar punitive damages awards as putting the defendant on fair notice 
that such large awards were possible for egregious misconduct resulting 
in a death.270 
This trend of looking to comparable punitive damages awards in 
other cases is not difficult to explain. Reviewing other judicial opinions 
and looking for similarities and differences is an exercise with which lower 
courts are much more comfortable than trying to locate and compare civil 
penalties for misconduct arguably similar to the defendant’s actions. Just 
as in the field of noneconomic damages, however, comparison to other 
cases involving different party and claim characteristics can be fraught 
with inexactitude271 and may ultimately be vulnerable to similar concerns 
about predictability and fairness.272 Such comparisons may also tend 
overall to reduce punitive damages awards where the court cannot find a 
comparably high precedent.273 
The final comparability category includes consideration of criminal 
penalties that might be imposed against the defendant. This metric was 
only considered in twelve percent of the cases in our study, and only actually 
employed in thirty-four (or seven percent) of cases.274 The infrequency of 
comparisons to criminal sanctions can most likely be explained by Justice 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Few, 705 S.E.2d 457, 464 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (“A review of case law uncovered 
no case factually on point with this one. However, research revealed several comparable cases on the lower 
end of the single-digit spectrum.”); Lens, supra note 66, at 33 n.192 (information about comparable punitive 
damages verdicts inherently “skeletal” and subject to the selection bias of courts choosing to publish 
punitive damages analysis). 
 272. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and 
Implications for Reform, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 103 (2002); cf. Harry Zavos, Monetary Damages for 
Nonmonetary Losses: An Integrated Answer to the Problem of the Meaning, Function, and Calculation 
of Noneconomic Damages, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 193 (2009). 
 273. See, e.g., Bell v. Helmsley, No. 111085/01, 2003 WL 1453108, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 2003) 
(“If one and one half million dollars was the outer constitutionally permissible limit in McIntyre, then 
clearly a $10 million dollar award in the instant case is grossly excessive.”); Tomao v. Abbott Labs., No. 04 
C 3470, 2007 WL 2225905 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2007) (emphasizing that the plaintiff failed to identify “any 
comparable cases in this jurisdiction upholding an award of $3,00,000 in punitive damages”). 
 274. See, e.g., Payne v. Jones, 696 F.3d 189, 203 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that although the criminal 
penalty for misdemeanor included jail time, such a sentence was not mandatory); Allam v. Meyers, 906 
F. Supp. 2d 274, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (acknowledging possible relevance of pending criminal charges 
against the defendant); Chavarria v. Fleetwood Retail Corp., 143 P.3d 717, 729–30 (N.M. 2006). In one 
of the few cases where the criminal penalty was determinative, the defendant had pled guilty to 
embezzlement for the same misconduct at issue in the civil case, and was already serving time. See Riggan v. 
Glass, 734 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).  
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Kennedy’s dictum in Campbell, warning that while consideration of possible 
criminal sanctions might be appropriate in evaluating the severity with 
which to judge the reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct, comparisons 
to criminal penalties in assessing the amount of punitive damages itself 
are not likely to produce the “fair notice” the Court had in mind when 
establishing the comparability guidepost.275 Indeed, one scholar recently 
described Campbell’s treatment of criminal penalties as tantamount to 
the complete elimination of such comparisons for purposes of conducting 
the third guidepost.276 In all events, the comparability guidepost has 
certainly not fared as well as the other two guideposts in its acceptance 
by, and usefulness to, courts reviewing punitive damages awards for 
unconstitutional excessiveness. It appears well on its way to desuetude. 
D. Constraining “Outlier” Awards 
 To the extent that Exxon, admittedly not a due process decision, 
identified the unpredictability of outlier awards as the crux of the Court’s 
continued interest in punitive damages, we examined the cases in our 
study for evidence of what the Court might regard as worrisome outliers. 
In Exxon, Justice Souter opined that while studies of median punitive 
damages reflected reasonable ratios, they also revealed an unacceptable 
“spread between high and low individual awards.”277 Addressing awards 
at the high end of that continuum, Justice Souter explained that “outlier 
cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding 
compensatories.”278 The opinion fails to directly define what the Court 
means by a punitive damages award that “dwarfs” the compensatories, 
but in the same paragraph, Justice Souter cited a study showing that 
“fully 14% of punitive awards in 2001 were greater than four times the 
compensatory damages,” and “a different data set found that 34% of the 
punitive awards were greater than three times the corresponding 
compensatory damages.”279 
 If the Court is taking the position that awards greater than 3:1 or 
4:1 could verge on “outlier” status, approximately forty-two percent of 
the cases in our study would qualify.280 A significant proportion of those 
cases, however, would presumably be exempt from the court’s approbation 
because the high ratios resulted from low compensatory damages. As seen 
above in Figures 1 and 2, even with the elimination of cases in our sample 
 
 275. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423–24 (2003). 
 276. Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The Importance 
of Legislative Limits, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 109, 138 (2008). 
 277. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008). 
 278. Id. at 500. 
 279. Id.  
 280. See supra Table 8.  
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with compensatory awards less than $100,000, sizeable numbers of cases 
with final ratios exceeding 3:1 and 4:1 still remain. Another way to 
approach the question of outlier awards is to examine ratios by the size 
of the final award of punitive damages. Figure 3 below presents ratio data 
by three categories of punitive damages, amounts from $5–9.9 million, from 
$10–49 million, and over $50 million. 
Figure 3: Post-Review Ratios by Amount of Punitive Damages 
 
 While a large number of cases in this set reflect ratios at or below 
4:1, in each punitive amount category, a substantial percentage exceed 
4:1. In the $5–9.9 million category, eleven of twenty-eight or thirty-nine 
percent of the cases in our study exceeded a 4:1 ratio. Of the thirty-one 
cases in the $10–49 million category, fifteen or forty-eight percent fell at or 
above 4:1. Even in the last category of punitive awards over $50 million, 
four of the eleven or thirty-six percent exceeded 4:1. The numbers involved 
in each category, especially the last one, are too small to permit broad 
conclusions about the frequency of outlier awards, but the Court’s dicta 
in Exxon suggests it might well disapprove of the lower courts’ handling 
of these high punitive damages cases.281 
Conclusion 
 Our empirical research examined ten years of federal and state cases 
applying the mandated constitutional excessiveness review of punitive 
damage awards. The sample of 507 cases we studied is not, of course, 
representative of all punitive damages cases during that time period because 
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we limited our study to published opinions. Nonetheless, our sample 
provides insights into how lower courts have interpreted and implemented 
the Supreme Court’s due process-driven excessiveness analysis. 
 While some inconsistencies in the application of the three guideposts 
can be expected, especially given the wide range of substantive claim 
categories in which punitive damages may be imposed, some inconsistencies 
appear to be attributable to a lack of uniform understanding regarding the 
guideposts themselves. One of the most fundamental areas of confusion 
among lower courts stems from the Court’s failure to explain how each 
guidepost interacts with the others. For example, if application of the 
first guidepost leads to an assessment of high reprehensibility, may a 
court approve a ratio above the Court’s 4:1 or single digit demarcations, 
or a 1:1 ratio in a case involving substantial compensatory damages?  
 The lower courts in our sample also varied markedly in how they 
analyzed the degree of reprehensibility. As demonstrated in Table 2, 
some courts neglected to expressly consider any of the Court’s indicia of 
reprehensibility, while others examined one, two, three, four, or five of 
the factors. Given the Court’s own inconsistencies on this score,282 perhaps 
it only intends for lower courts to identify some threshold sign of 
reprehensibility, but that would surely justify only punitive liability itself 
rather than the excessiveness of any particular award. A more thorough 
approach that analyzes each of the five proposed indicia would better 
help explain a particularly high punitive award or suggest the sufficiency 
of a smaller amount.  
 Moreover, lower courts attempting to apply the Court’s 
reprehensibility factors have often found them unavailing or frustrating 
in cases involving misconduct or harms beyond the economic realm. 
Dignitary, constitutional, or emotional harms, for example, do not fit readily 
into the Court’s binary description of the first indicia of reprehensibility, 
physical versus economic harm.283 Similarly, the Court has identified the 
heightened culpability of a defendant who targets plaintiffs with financial 
vulnerabilities, but has not yet had occasion to acknowledge other plaintiff 
vulnerabilities equally deserving of vindication.284 
 Finally, if the Court is serious about describing as a potential 
“outlier” a punitive damages award resulting in a ratio in excess of 1:1 
where plaintiff has been awarded substantial (that is, non-negative value) 
compensatory damages,285 it would do well to better explicate the degree 
of reprehensibility that might justify ratios higher than 1:1. As Figure 2 
shows, courts in fifty-two percent of the cases in our sample involving 
 
282. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 433–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
283. See supra notes 102 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra notes 106–13113 and accompanying text. 
285. See Exxon, 554 U.S. at 512–13. 
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compensatory damage awards in excess of a million dollars approved 
punitive damage to compensatory ratios of 2:1 or higher.286  
 
286. See Figure 2 and accompanying text. 
